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ARTICLE
THE TAX CODE AS NATIONALITY LAW
MICHAEL S. KIRSCH*
This Article questions the frequently asserted axiom that Congress's tax-
ing power knows no bounds. It does so in the context of recently enacted leg-
islation that creates a special definition of citizenship that applies only for
tax purposes. Historically, a person was treated as a citizen for tax purposes
(and therefore taxed on her worldwide income and estate) if and only if she
was a citizen under the nationality law. As a result of the new statute, in cer-
tain circumstances a person might be treated as a citizen for tax purposes (and
therefore taxed on her worldwide income and estate) for years or even dec-
ades after she is no longer a "real" citizen under the nationality law. The analy-
sis first looks at international law principles, concluding that in certain cir-
cumstances the new statute exceeds the prescriptive jurisdictional limits of
customary international law. It then examines the constitutional implications,
arguing that the statute, at least in certain circumstances, reflects a rare oc-
casion where Congress might have exceeded its Article I taxing powers. More-
over, even to the extent the statute is within Congress's powers, certain as-
pects of it violate the due process limitations of the Fifth Amendment. These
conclusions highlight the importance of Congress taking constitutional and
international law considerations more seriously with respect to future legisla-
tion in the increasingly important area of international taxation.
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Tax Code as Nationality Law
To boost the [national] economy I'd tax all foreigners living
abroad.
-Monty Python's Flying Circus'
This Article explores the outer limits of Congress's power to tax in-
dividuals in an international context. Traditionally, the United States has
been among the most aggressive countries in exercising taxing jurisdic-
tion abroad. The United States is the only major country that taxes the
worldwide income of its citizens even if they live outside the country.2
Notwithstanding its existing position at the outer edges of taxing ju-
risdiction, the United States recently stretched these limits even further.
As part of the American Jobs Creation Act ("AJCA") of 2004,1 Congress
adopted special provisions for determining whether an individual is con-
sidered a "citizen" for federal tax purposes and is thereby subject to taxa-
tion on her worldwide income. Prior to the enactment of the AJCA, the
tax code definition of citizenship relied on the nationality law definition
of citizenship: a person was treated as a citizen for tax purposes if, and only
if, she was a citizen under the nationality law.4 The enactment of the AJCA
broke this direct link between the tax code and nationality law, at least in
certain circumstances, and it is now possible for an individual to be treated
as a citizen for tax purposes during a period when she is not a U.S. citi-
zen under nationality law.5
The ACJA provisions that added sections 877(g) and 7701(n) to the
Internal Revenue Code focus on a particular group of individuals: those
who had been U.S. citizens but who renounced or otherwise lost their
citizenship under the nationality law. 6 The new Code sections were intended
to prevent perceived abuses of the tax law by these expatriates.7 However,
in enacting these anti-abuse provisions, Congress gave little attention to
the broader consequences of unmooring the tax code definition of citi-
zenship from the nationality law.
'GRAHAM CHAPMAN ET AL., THE COMPLETE MONTY PYTHON'S FLYING CIRCUS: ALL
THE WORDS 196 (1989).
1 See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL As-
PECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES TAXATION OF
FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF THE FOREIGN INCOME OF UNITED STATES PERSONS 6 (1987).
3 Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 804, 118 Stat. 1418, 1569 (2004).
4 But see infra note 114 (discussing very limited circumstances when the IRS by ad-
ministrative ruling provided tax relief for certain periods when an individual was a citizen
under the nationality law).
I The new AJCA provisions do not enable the opposite result-the treatment of an in-
dividual as a noncitizen for tax purposes when she is a citizen under the nationality law.
6 The provisions also address persons who had been long-term residents (i.e., green
card holders in at least eight of the preceding fifteen years) and who surrendered or other-
wise lost that status.
I The term "expatriate" in this Article refers to an individual who has lost U.S. citizen-
ship, not to a person who resides abroad but retains her U.S. citizenship.
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This Article addresses the extent to which the special definitions of
citizenship for federal tax purposes violate customary international law
and constitutional limitations. In so doing, it considers what, if any, limits
constrain Congress from moving toward the absurdist position of the in-
troductory epigraph, which contemplates a country attempting to tax aliens
who have absolutely no connection to that country.
Part I discusses the tax code's traditional reliance on the nationality
law definition of citizenship and examines the concerns that led Congress
to enact the new special definitions of citizenship for tax purposes. Part II
then examines the relevant jurisdictional contours of international law, with
a particular focus on prescriptive limitations under customary international
law. It concludes that, at least in some circumstances, the new tax definitions
of citizenship violate customary international law jurisdictional princi-
ples.
Part III examines the constitutional implications of the new tax
definitions of citizenship. In particular, it considers the limits, if any, of
Congress's taxing power under Article I as well as the constraints imposed
by due process and equal protection principles. While acknowledging that
Congress's taxing powers are almost unlimited, it argues that this is a
rare circumstance in which Congress might have exceeded its sovereign
taxing powers. Moreover, even if the provisions are within Congress's Arti-
cle I taxing powers, certain aspects of the new provisions violate the due
process limitations of the Fifth Amendment. Part IV addresses additional
concerns raised by the new provisions, particularly with respect to the
United States tax treaty network, relations with other countries, and prac-
tical enforcement difficulties.
The Article concludes that the significant constitutional, international
law, and other problems raised by the new provisions greatly outweigh
any purported benefits and that Congress should return to a uniform defini-
tion of citizenship for both tax and nationality law purposes. More gener-
ally, the Article demonstrates that there are constitutional and interna-
tional law limits on Congress's ability to tax individuals in the international
context and that these limitations deserve increased attention when Con-
gress enacts future legislation.
I. THE NEW DEFINITION OF TAX CITIZENSHIP
A. Why Citizenship Matters for Tax Purposes
In general, the United States taxes the worldwide income of its citi-
zens and resident aliens regardless of where the individual lives or where
the income arises.8 In contrast, the United States taxes a nonresident alien-
' I.R.C. § 1 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (as amended in 1974). This worldwide taxa-
tion of citizens and resident aliens is subject to several significant exceptions. For example,
[Vol. 43
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a person who is neither a citizen nor a resident alien 9-only on income
connected with U.S. business activities ° and certain investment-type in-
come from United States sources." A nonresident alien generally is not
subject to U.S. income tax on income from sources outside the United States
or on capital gains from the sale of property, regardless of where the prop-
erty is located.
Because of this disparity between the income taxation of citizens and
nonresident aliens, as well as similar distinctions in the context of the estate
and gift tax regime,' 2 incentives exist for a U.S. citizen to move outside the
United States and surrender her citizenship status, thereby becoming a
nonresident alien for tax purposes. 3 In response to concerns about tax-
motivated expatriation, Congress in 1966 enacted a special alternative tax
regime under Internal Revenue Code section 877 applicable to tax-moti-
vated expatriates.' 4 This regime did not purport to tax the former citizen
on her worldwide income. Rather, it expanded the definition of U.S. source
income upon which the former citizen could be taxed for a ten-year pe-
riod 5 following the loss of citizenship.' 6 During the past decade, Congress
a qualified individual may exclude up to $80,000 of foreign earned income, as well as
certain foreign housing costs, from her gross income. See I.R.C. § 911. In addition, the
United States generally allows a tax credit to the extent of foreign income taxes imposed
on the individual's foreign-source income. See I.R.C. §§ 901, 903-905 (2000).
9 In general, a noncitizen is treated as a resident alien for income tax purposes during
the year if she meets at least one of three tests: (1) the lawful permanent resident test; (2) the
substantial presence test; or (3) the first-year election test. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A). Only
the first two tests are relevant to this Article. The lawful permanent residence test applies if
the individual is a "lawful permanent resident" (i.e., green card holder) under the immigra-
tion laws at any time during the calendar year. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000). The sub-
stantial presence test generally applies if the individual is physically present in the United
States for at least 31 days during the calendar year and for at least 183 days under a three-
year weighted formula (calculated by adding the days of physical presence in the current
year, plus 1/3 of such days in the immediately preceding year, plus 1/6 of such days in the
second preceding year). See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (2000).
"oSee I.R.C. § 871(b) (2000).
"See I.R.C. § 87 1(a) (2000).
12 For a discussion of the disparate estate and gift tax treatment of citizens and non-
resident aliens, see Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Sym-
bols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89
IOWA L. REV. 863, 871-73 (2004).
11 Of course, significant non-tax considerations weigh heavily against surrendering
U.S. citizenship. In particular, a former citizen would no longer enjoy the rights and privi-
leges associated with U.S. citizenship. See id. at 875. Moreover, feelings of patriotism and
loyalty might preclude many citizens from expatriating regardless of the potential tax
benefits that might be derived from the surrender of citizenship. Id. at 894.
4 For a summary of the 1966 law and its 1996 amendments, see id. at 877-86.
'1 The so-called "ten-year period" could, as a practical matter, apply for slightly less
than ten full years. See id. at 879 n.63.
16 In particular, the section 877 alternative tax regime expands the definition of U.S.-
source income so that the individual will be taxable on capital gains from the sale of stock
in a U.S. corporation during the ten-year period. However, the individual, as a nonresident
alien, will not be subject to tax on her foreign-source investment income and her foreign
business income. The alternative tax regime also expanded the definition of U.S. situs property
that could be subjected to the gift and estate tax for ten years following expatriation. See
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has expended significant effort addressing perceived shortcomings in this
regime, enacting legislation in this area in 199611 and again in 2004.8
B. Historic Reliance on Nationality Act Definition of Citizenship
Given the significant U.S. tax consequences that turn on citizenship,
an important threshold question is whether or not an individual is a citizen
for tax purposes. Prior to the enactment of the AJCA, the Internal Reve-
nue Code did not define citizenship.19 Instead, the tax law traditionally
relied on the definition of citizenship under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA).2" Thus, if an individual was considered a citizen under the na-
tionality laws, she was treated as a citizen for tax purposes.2 If an indi-
I.R.C. §§ 2107, 2501(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2006).
17 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 511, 110 Stat. 1936, 2093 (1996) (modifying sections 877, 2107, and 2501(a)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code).
18 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 804, 118 Stat. 1418,
1569. In addition to adding the new tax-focused definitions of citizenship described at
length in this Article, AJCA eliminated the tax-motivation test for determining whether the
alternative tax regime applies, replacing it with objective tests based on average income tax
liability and net worth. With certain exceptions, a person who loses citizenship is subject to
the alternative regime of section 877 if her average income tax liability for the five pre-
expatriation years exceeds $124,000 (as modified annually for cost-of-living adjustments),
her net worth on the date of expatriation is at least $2 million, or she fails to comply with
certain documentation requirements. See I.R.C. § 877(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
19 As discussed infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text, the staff of the Joint Com-
mittee of Taxation prepared a report in 2003 analyzing the effectiveness of the 1996 legis-
lation and containing proposals that were subsequently enacted by the AJCA. See STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REVIEW OF THE PRESENT-LAW TAX AND IMMI-
GRATION TREATMENT OF RELINQUISHMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND TERMINATION OF LONG-
TERM RESIDENCY (Comm. Print JCS-2-03, 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-
2-03.pdf [hereinafter 2003 JCT REPORT]. The 2003 JCT Report, referring to a transition
rule in the 1996 legislation, stated that "there is some precedent for the divergence of the
tax and nationality definitions of citizenship." Id. at 124. The transition rule cited, however,
only involved an extension of the ten-year period under section 877 for certain pre-
effective date expatriations if the individual delayed giving notice of citizenship loss to the
Department of State. Id. at 80-81. The transition rule did not purport to continue taxing the
individual on her worldwide income for periods after citizenship was lost under the nation-
ality law.
208 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000). This cross-reference to the nationality law appears
in the Treasury Regulations rather than the Internal Revenue Code. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1-
1(c) (as amended in 1974) (paraphrasing the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and citing Immigration and Nationality Act provisions and Supreme Court decisions
regarding citizenship).
This historical reliance on the nationality law's definition of citizenship dates back to
the earliest days of the modern income tax. Although the early statutes did not explicitly
state that the term "citizen" as used in the tax acts had the same meaning as under national-
ity law, such a connection was evident in early administrative guidance. See T.D. 3406, 1-2
C.B. 42 (1922) (quoting the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's statement that a newly
enacted nationality law, "while not an internal-revenue measure, is published for the in-
formation and guidance of revenue officers and others concerned in determining the citi-
zenship" of relevant taxpayers); see also T.D. 861, 4 C.B. 59-60 (1921); T.D. 695, 3 C.B.
74 (1920); T.D. 533, 2 C.B. 59 (1920).
21 In isolated circumstances involving individuals whose citizenship has been restored
2006] Tax Code as Nationality Law
vidual was not considered a citizen under the nationality law, she was
treated as an alien for tax purposes.
In effect, this reliance on the nationality law kept the Internal Reve-
nue Service out of the business of determining a taxpayer's citizenship
status. Instead, such determinations were left to those federal departments
with principal administrative responsibility over the immigration and na-
tionality laws-mosf recently, the Department of State22 and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security.2
3
Of particular relevance, for tax purposes the timing of citizenship
loss was tied directly to the Department of State's administrative procedures
for determining citizenship loss under the INA. The INA provides that an
individual can lose citizenship by voluntarily performing one of several
enumerated acts, provided the act was performed with the intent to relin-
quish citizenship. 4 These acts fall into two categories. First, an individ-
ual can make a formal renunciation of citizenship by executing an oath of
renunciation before a U.S. diplomatic or consular officer outside the United
States.25 Second, rather than making a formal renunciation, an individual
can commit one of several potentially expatriating acts enumerated in the
statute, such as obtaining nationality in another country after reaching age
eighteen or taking an oath of allegiance to another country after reaching age
eighteen.26
retroactively due to changes in nationality law interpretation, the IRS has issued adminis-
trative rulings treating those individuals as noncitizens for portions of the retroactivity
period. See infra note 114.
22 The Department of State is responsible for determining the citizenship status of a
person located outside the United States, or in connection with the application for a U.S.
passport while in the United States. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 50.1, 51.20, 51.40-43, 51.54, 51.80(a)(1)
(2005); see also Department of State, Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship and Dual National-
ity, http://travel.state.gov/law/citizenship/citizenship-778.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
This authority includes determinations of loss of citizenship status. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 50.40-51
(2005) (discussed infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text).
23 Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as of March 1, 2003, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security-in particular, its Bureau of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services-took over the immigration and naturalization functions previously handled by
the Department of Justice's Immigration and Naturalization Service. See The Homeland
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 451, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1.1
(2005).
24 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2000). Originally, the performance of an enumerated act caused an
individual to lose citizenship regardless of whether the individual intended to lose citizen-
ship thereby. See INA § 349, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 267-68 (1952); see also
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 61 (1958), overruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253,
268 (1967). However, the Supreme Court subsequently determined that the Fourteenth
Amendment prevents Congress from stripping an individual of citizenship based solely on
a particular act unaccompanied by an intent of the individual to lose citizenship. Afroyim,
387 U.S. at 257. Congress subsequently amended the INA to make this intent requirement
explicit. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653
§ 18(a), 100 Stat. 3658.
25 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (2000).
26 Id. §§ 1481(a)(1)-(2). Other potentially expatriating acts in this second category in-
clude serving as an officer in the armed forces of another country, serving at any rank in
the armed forces of a country engaged in hostilities against the United States, serving as an
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Whereas an individual's intent to relinquish citizenship is clear in
the case of a formal renunciation before a consular officer, an individual's
intent often is not clear when she performs one of the other potentially expa-
triating acts. For example, a U.S. citizen who becomes a naturalized citi-
zen of another country may or may not intend thereby to surrender her U.S.
citizenship.27 The INA requires that the party asserting that citizenship
has been lost must establish the existence of requisite intent by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 8
The Department of State has established administrative presumptions to
determine whether an individual who performs a potentially expatriating
act had the intent to relinquish citizenship.2 9 In the case of three potentially
expatriating acts-naturalization in a foreign country, taking a routine oath
of allegiance to a foreign country, or accepting non-policy level employ-
ment with a foreign government-the Department of State presumes that
the individual intended to retain her U.S. citizenship unless the individual
affirmatively asserts to a consular officer that the act was performed with
the intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship." In the case of any other poten-
tially expatriating act,3 a U.S. consular officer attempts to ascertain whether
there is evidence of intent to relinquish U.S. nationality.32 If the consular
official believes that an individual has lost citizenship under these stan-
dards, the official prepares a certificate of loss of nationality, which is then
forwarded to the Department of State for approval.33
officer or employee of a foreign government under certain circumstances, making a formal
written renunciation of U.S. citizenship while in the United States during a time of war, or
committing treason or attempting to overthrow the government of the United States.
§§ 1481(a)(3)-(4), (6)-(7); see also Kirsch, supra note 12, at 873 n.40.
27 In the Afroyim case, where the Supreme Court set out the intent requirement, Mr.
Afroyim, a naturalized U.S. citizen, had voted in an election in Israel. 387 U.S. at 254-55.
At the time, the INA provided that voting in a foreign election caused a U.S. citizen to lose
his citizenship. Id. The Afroyim Court held that Mr. Afroyim could not be stripped of his
U.S. citizenship in the absence of evidence that he intended to relinquish his citizenship by
voting in the foreign election. Id. at 268.
28 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b); see also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 267 (1980) (upholding
Congress's constitutional authority to legislate this "preponderance of evidence" standard
for determining intent). While the Department of State is usually the party asserting that
the individual intended to lose citizenship, in the case of an individual seeking to invoke
citizenship loss to avoid taxes, the citizen assumes this role. See U.S. v. Matheson, 532
F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1976); see also U.S. v. Lucienne D'Hotelle de Benitez Rexach, 558
F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1977).
29 22 C.F.R. § 50.40(a) (2005). These presumptions were in effect even before their
adoption as federal regulations in 1996. See Letter from Wendy R. Sherman, Assistant
Sec'y for Legislative Affairs, Dep't of State, to Sen. Robert Packwood, Tab 2 (May 9, 1995),
reprinted in STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., ISSUES PRESENTED
BY PROPOSALS TO MODIFY THE TAX TREATMENT OF EXPATRIATION G-59 (Comm. Print
JCS-17-95 1995), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-17-95.pdf, at 249 [hereinafter 1995
JCT REPORT].
30 22 C.F.R. § 50.40(a).
31 See supra note 26.
32 Letter from Wendy R. Sherman, reprinted in 1995 JCT REPORT, supra note 29, at G-
59.
33 See 8 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000); 22 C.F.R. § 50.40(c) (2000). The Department of State
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Of particular relevance, the actual date of citizenship loss is not gov-
erned by either the date the certificate of loss of nationality is prepared
by a consular official or the date on which it ultimately is approved by the
Department of State.3 4 Rather, an individual's loss of citizenship is effec-
tive under the nationality law as of the date the expatriating act occurs
(provided it was done with the requisite intent).35 Thus, in the case of an ex-
patriating act other than a formal renunciation, there could be a significant
gap between the date citizenship is lost and the time when a consular official
is notified of the loss and the Department of State documents the loss.
C. New Tax-Specific Definitions of Citizenship
In 2004, Congress enacted the AJCA, which unmoored the tax defini-
tion of citizenship from the INA nationality law definition.3 6 In two par-
ticular circumstances the AJCA treats an individual as a U.S. citizen for
tax purposes with respect to a period when the individual is not a citizen
under the nationality laws.37 The following Sections briefly describe the
two circumstances where the AJCA creates a special definition of citizen-
ship for tax purposes and provide a brief summary of the congressional
rationale for the provisions.
1. Delayed Loss of Citizenship-Section 7701(n)
New Internal Revenue Code section 7701(n), as enacted by the AJCA,38
provides that an individual who relinquishes citizenship under the na-
tionality laws nonetheless continues to be treated as a citizen for tax pur-
poses until the individual both notifies the Secretary of State that she has
committed an expatriating act with the requisite intent and provides, a
statement to the IRS in accordance with Internal Revenue Code section
6039G.3 9 Whereas the loss of citizenship is effective for nationality law pur-
typically takes between two weeks and six months to approve a certificate of loss of na-
•tionality submitted by a consular official. See Letter from Wendy R. Sherman, reprinted at
1995 JCT REPORT, supra note 29, at G-55.
34 See Letter from Wendy R. Sherman, reprinted at 1995 JCT REPORT, supra note 29,
at G-55.
35 Id.
36 The AJCA also modified certain aspects of the substantive tax rules that apply to in-
dividuals who relinquish citizenship or long-term resident status. See AJCA, Pub. L. 108-
357, § 804(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1659 (2004).
11 The nationality law's definition of citizenship continues to govern for tax purposes
in other contexts.
31 § 804(b), 118 Stat. at 1570; see also § 804(0, 118 Stat. at 1573 (applying the provi-
sion to individuals who expatriate after June 3, 2004); Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005,
Pub. L No. 109-135, § 403(v), 119 Stat. 2577, 2628 (making technical amendments to Internal
Revenue Code section 7701(n)).
39 I.R.C. § 770 1(n) (LexisNexis 2006). The cross-reference to the information report-
ing requirement of I.R.C. § 6039G is somewhat vague. Section 6039G requires reporting
by "any individual to whom section 877(b) applies for any taxable year." I.R.C. § 6039G(a)
20061
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poses as of the date of the expatriating act, it is not effective for tax pur-
poses until both of these notification requirements are satisfied. Thus, under
the new provision, it is possible for an expatriate to remain a citizen for
tax purposes, taxable on her worldwide income, for many years after citi-
zenship has been lost for nationality law purposes, even for the remainder
of the individual's life.' Moreover, at her death her worldwide assets could
be subject to U.S. estate tax.
This provision was based on a recommendation made by the staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation in a 2003 report on the taxation of expa-
triates.41 In that report, the committee staff noted the pre-AJCA tax en-
forcement difficulties raised by the "lag time between citizenship relin-
quishment, which occurs upon the individual's completion of an expatri-
ating act with the requisite intent to relinquish citizenship, and the date
upon which the Department of State receives notice of the citizenship relin-
quishment. '42 In particular, the special income tax provisions pertaining
to individuals who renounce citizenship with a principal purpose of tax
avoidance apply for the ten-year period following the citizenship loss. 3 The
committee staff noted that under pre-AJCA law, a significant portion of
this time period might elapse before the IRS learns of the expatriation,
thereby creating a significant enforcement hardship for the IRS.'
An additional potential concern, not directly addressed by the joint
committee report or other legislative reports, might also have influenced
the enactment of the new provision. As discussed above, the State Depart-
ment utilizes administrative presumptions in determining whether a citi-
zen who performs a potentially expatriating act had the requisite intent to
relinquish citizenship.45 In a 1998 report, the Treasury Department ex-
pressed concern that these presumptions could "provide[ ] a potential expa-
(LexisNexis 2006). Thus, it focuses on ongoing annual reporting during the ten years that
an expatriate is subject to the special income tax regime of I.R.C. § 877. Section 6039G, as
amended by AJCA, does not expressly require the filing of an information statement at the
time citizenship is purportedly lost. Nonetheless, in the context of I.R.C. § 7701(n)(2), the
I.R.S. has interpreted "a statement in accordance with section 6039G" to refer to the initial
information reporting that the expatriate makes on IRS Form 8854, Initial and Annual
Expatriation Information Statement. See Notice 2005-36, 2005-19 I.R.B. 1007; see also
I.R.S., Instructions for Form 8854, at 2.
40 Similarly, a former long-term resident who fails to notify the IRS of the loss of such
status can continue to be taxed as a resident in perpetuity, even after she surrenders her
green card to the Department of Homeland Security. See I.R.C. § 7701(n)(2). Although
many of the arguments set forth in this Article also apply to former long-term residents who
continue to be taxed as residents pursuant to the AJCA provisions, this Article focuses
primarily on former citizens.
41 See 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 208-10; see also H.R. REP. No. 108-548,
pt. 1, at 253 (2004) (citing similar enforcement concerns as those raised by the Joint Commit-
tee staff).
42 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 124.
43 See I.R.C. § 877(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
44 See 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 124, 209.
4' See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43
Tax Code as Nationality Law
triate with the ability to engage in significant tax planning"4 6 and "allow
certain expatriating citizens to avoid U.S. worldwide taxing jurisdiction
for periods when they might have been entitled to receive the benefits of
U.S. citizenship.
47
In particular, a U.S. citizen willing to surrender citizenship to avoid
taxes might commit a potentially expatriating act, such as obtaining nation-
ality in another country, yet refrain from notifying a consular official as
to any expatriating intent. Thus, the individual could retain her "ability to
invoke [her] U.S. citizenship if, for example, an emergency arose and [she]
needed the assistance of a U.S. embassy or consulate."4 8 Yet, if at some
future date the individual determines that losing citizenship at the earlier
date would have been tax advantageous (e.g., if the IRS audits the indi-
vidual and asserts worldwide taxation over the individual based on her
citizenship), the individual could inform a consular official that the ear-
lier expatriating act had been performed with an intent to lose citizen-
ship. In the absence of contrary evidence,49 the Department of State pre-
sumably would accept the individual's statement of intent and would docu-
ment the individual's loss of citizenship under the nationality law retro-
active to the date of the expatriating act. Because the tax law definition of
citizenship refers to the nationality law, the loss would also be retroactive
for tax purposes. In effect, the subjective intent criteria and the retroac-
tive nature of the citizenship loss under the nationality law allow the in-
dividual "to determine after the fact whether an expatriation effective
from the earlier date would be tax advantageous now."'5 'During the period
between the acquisition of the foreign nationality and the date, if any,
that the IRS audits the individual, she would retain the ability to claim
that she remained a U.S. citizen. If, for example, she faced an emergency
that required assistance of a U.S. consulate or embassy or she decided to
return to the United States to live, the State Department, under its admin-
istrative presumptions, would accept that assertion.
46 OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, DEP'T OF TREASURY, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE BY U.S. CITI-
ZENS AND U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS RESIDING OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
AND RELATED ISSUES 33 (1998), reprinted in 98 LEXIS TNT 87-16 [hereinafter TREASURY
REPORT]. In the interest of disclosure, it should be noted that the author, while working at
the Internal Revenue Service and subsequently at the Treasury Department, participated in
the drafting of the Treasury Report.
47 Id. at 28.
48 Id. at 33.
41 Contrary evidence could include "evidence of travel on a U.S. passport or of any
other acts unequivocally indicating that the person had held himself out as a U.S. citizen"
during the period following the potentially expatriating act. Id.
50 Id. at 34. A similar result would apply for gift and estate tax purposes. For example,
if the individual died before notifying a consular official about a potentially expatriating
act, her executor might attempt to argue that the individual intended to lose citizenship
pursuant to the act, and therefore the estate should not be subject to U.S. estate tax on its
worldwide assets.
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The 1998 Treasury Report, in highlighting this potential abuse, did
not assert that a significant number of citizens were engaging in this abuse
of the State Department administrative presumptions for tax avoidance
purposes. Rather, the report described the scheme in hypothetical terms.5'
The two-pronged test of citizenship loss under new Internal Revenue
Code section 7701(n) would prevent this abuse by ignoring, for tax pur-
poses, the retroactive effect of citizenship loss under the nationality law. An
individual would remain a citizen for tax purposes until she notified the
U.S. consular official of an expatriating act and intent (assuming that she
also complied with the IRS notification requirement). Thus, under the new
law, an individual could no longer gain the tax advantages of retroac-
tively revoking citizenship. The new tax provision does not alter the na-
tionality law rules, so the loss would still be retroactive for nationality law
purposes.
The new law goes much further than merely shutting down this po-
tential abuse of the nationality law. It also creates the possibility of con-
tinued worldwide taxation even for periods after the State Department has
issued the certificate of loss of nationality, when the possibility no longer
exists that the individual could try to invoke the benefits of citizenship. Be-
cause new section 7701(n) delays the loss of citizenship for tax purposes
until both the notification of a consular official and the filing under I.R.C.
section 6039G,52 an individual who fails to file IRS Form 8854 as required
by section 6039G would remain a U.S. citizen for tax purposes even after
notifying the Department of State, subjecting her to continued worldwide
U.S. tax liability for the remainder of her lifetime,53 as well as worldwide
U.S. estate taxation upon her death.
54
2. Reacquisition of Renounced Citizenship-Section 877(g)
New Internal Revenue Code section 877(g), also enacted by the AJCA,
creates a second tax code departure from the nationality law definition of
citizenship. Whereas section 7701(n) focuses on the timing of citizenship
loss, section 877(g) addresses the period following citizenship loss. Pur-
suant to section 877(g), certain individuals who lose citizenship under the
nationality law and have that loss recognized for tax purposes under sec-
tion 7701(n) may, nonetheless, be treated as citizens for tax purposes in
future years. In particular, if an expatriate who is subject to the alterna-
tive tax regime of section 87711 is physically present in the United States
1 Id. at 28.
52 I.R.C. § 6039G (LexisNexis 2006).
13 If the individual fails to file income tax returns voluntarily, the period of limitations
for assessing tax will remain open indefinitely. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3) (2000).
14 See Notice 2005-36, supra note 39.
51 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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for more than thirty days in any of the ten years following expatriation5 6
she will be treated as a citizen for tax purposes during that year.57 Accord-
ingly, during that year she will be subject to U.S. income taxation on her
worldwide income and, if she makes any gifts or dies during that year, she
will be subject to U.S. gift or estate taxation on her worldwide gifts or es-
tate.1
8
Consider the example of an individual who committed a potentially
expatriating act in 2006 but did not notify the State Department of her expa-
triating intent and file IRS Form 8854 until 2010. Under section 7701(n),
she will be treated as losing citizenship for tax purposes in 2010, although
her citizenship loss for nationality law purposes will be retroactive to
2006. If her net worth or average pre-expatriation income tax liability ex-
ceeds the thresholds of section 877(a), she will be subject to the alterna-
tive tax regime of section 877(b) for ten years, beginning in 2010. As dis-
cussed previously,59 that alternative regime imposes tax on a broader range
of income from U.S. sources than would ordinarily apply to a nonresi-
dent alien, but it falls far short of imposing worldwide taxation on the
individual.
Assume that the individual visits the United States in 2014 and is
physically present in the country for 31 days during that year. Pursuant to
new section 877(g), the individual will be treated as a citizen for U.S. tax
purposes in 2014, even though she previously was treated as having lost
citizenship for tax purposes in 2010 (and for nationality law purposes in
2006). As a result, in 2014 she will be subject to U.S. taxation on her
worldwide income. Of course, the individual will not be treated as a citi-
56 This ten-year period in section 877(g) begins only when the individual is treated as
having lost citizenship for tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 7701(n) (LexisNexis 2006).
57 Section 877(g) provides that the special income tax regime of section 877:
[S]hall not apply to any individual to whom this section [877] would otherwise
apply for any taxable year during the 10-year period referred to in subsection (a)
in which such individual is physically present in the United States at any time on
more than 30 days in the calendar year ending in such taxable year, and such in-
dividual shall be treated for purposes of this title as a citizen or resident of the
United States, as the case may be, for such taxable year.
I.R.C. § 877(g)(1) (2000). The "as the case may be" language treats a former citizen who
runs afoul of the 30-day test as a citizen, and treats a former long-term resident who runs
afoul of the test as a resident. See H.R. REP. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 255 (2004).
The statute provides certain exceptions. In particular, in counting the number of days
of physical presence during the year, the former citizen may disregard up to thirty days in
which she is performing services in the United States for an employer, provided that the
individual is not related to the employer and the employer meets reporting requirements
that may be specified by the IRS. See I.R.C. § 877(g)(2)(A) (2000).
58 Because section 877(g), if applicable, treats the individual as a citizen for purposes
of the entire Internal Revenue Code, the citizenship definition applies not only to the in-
come tax regime but also to the estate and gift tax regimes. See H.R. REP. No. 108-548, pt.
1, at 255-56.
'9 See supra note 16.
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zen for nationality law purposes in 2014 and therefore will not be eligible
for any of the benefits of citizenship during that year.
According to the House Ways and Means Committee report, section
877(g) was enacted due to concern that "[i]ndividuals who relinquish citi-
zenship ... for tax reasons often do not want to fully sever their ties with
the United States; they hope to retain some of the benefits of citizenship
... without being subject to the U.S. tax system as a U.S. citizen."' In par-
ticular, Congress was concerned that an individual, following citizenship
loss, could spend an average of four months per year6' in the United States
without being treated as a resident alien taxable on worldwide income.
61
By treating a former citizen who spends more than thirty days in the United
States in a single calendar year as a citizen for tax purposes, the new
60 H.R. REP. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 253. The Committee report's assertion that a former
citizen might be able to retain some of the benefits of citizenship is somewhat misleading.
As discussed infra note 61 and accompanying text, the Committee's main concern focused
on individuals who spend significant time in the United States following their citizenship
loss. However, a former citizen who enters and spends time in the United States after re-
linquishing citizenship is subject to significant visa and other requirements generally ap-
plicable to aliens. This stands in stark contrast to a citizen, who can enter the United States
at will. Thus, while an expatriate might desire to retain various ties to the United States,
including the ability to make future visits, it is misleading to characterize those ties as a
continuation of citizenship benefits.
Like the new citizenship loss provision of section 7701(n), the new section 877(g)
citizenship reacquisition provision was based on a recommendation by the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation. See 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 210-11.
61 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 210-11. As discussed supra note 9, a non-
citizen can be treated as a resident alien, taxable on worldwide income, if she is physically
present in the United States for at least 31 days during the calendar year and for at least
183 days under a three-year weighted formula. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (2000). The com-
mittee report's reference to four months per year contemplates a non-citizen who spends
120 days in the United States in three successive years, yielding a total of 180 days under
the weighted formula, just under the 183-day threshold that would trigger resident status.
Even if the 183-day threshold is triggered, under certain circumstances the individual might be
able to avoid tax resident status, provided she is present in the United States for fewer than
183 days during the current year and has a closer connection to a foreign country in which
she has her tax home. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(B).
62 Congress previously addressed this purported abuse by former citizens attempting to
spend significant time in the United States. In 1996, it enacted legislation intended to per-
manently ban former citizens who had relinquished citizenship for tax-avoidance purposes
from reentering the United States. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 352, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-641. This pro-
vision, known as the "Reed Amendment," placed tax-motivated expatriates on the same
immigration law inadmissibility list that includes "terrorists, World War II-era Nazis, prac-
ticing polygamists, persons with communicable diseases, and persons convicted of certain
crimes." Kirsch, supra note 12, at 892 (citing INA § 212, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182). Due
to substantive and technical problems with the statute, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity has not yet implemented the provision, and in practice it has had only limited in ter-
rorem effects. See id. at 900. By enacting new I.R.C. section 877(g), which contemplates
the possibility of a former citizen spending significant amounts of time in the United States
after relinquishing citizenship, Congress has implicitly recognized the many shortcomings
of the Reed Amendment. See generally Kirsch, supra note 12 (critiquing the Reed Amendment
on instrumental, expressive, and symbolic grounds).
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provision eliminates any tax benefits the individual otherwise would have
enjoyed for that year by having previously renounced her citizenship.
II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS
The two recently enacted tax code definitions of citizenship raise signi-
ficant jurisdictional issues under international law. The relevant jurisdic-
tional principles of international law arise from two main sources: spe-
cific agreements, in the form of treaties or conventions, which may be either
bilateral between two states orr multilateral among several states; and inter-
national custom of nations that evidences a general practice accepted as
law (known as "customary international law").63
As a practical matter, most individuals who are subject to the AJCA
tax citizenship provisions would not be expected to establish residence in
a country with which the U.S. has a tax treaty.' Accordingly, the jurisdic-
tional limitations imposed on the United States by tax treaties would not
be of assistance to these individuals.6" Instead, these individuals would have
to rely on customary international law' to find potential jurisdictional
restrictions on the ability of the United States to enact the AJCA definitions
of tax citizenship.67
Customary international law addresses several jurisdictional catego-
ries.68 Of particular relevance to the present inquiry is the United States'
jurisdiction to prescribe 6 9-i.e., the extent of its authority "to make its sub-
63 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987). The Restatement cites a third source of international law, "derivation
from the general principles common to major legal systems of the world," see id. § 102(1 )(c),
although it acknowledges that treaties and customary international law represent the prin-
cipal sources. See id. at pt. 1, ch. 1, introductory note.
64 The majority of the United States' tax treaties are with countries that are members of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). To the extent that
taxes influence an individual's decision to surrender U.S. citizenship, that individual is more
likely to move to a non-OECD country with relatively low taxes and more limited ex-
change of tax information with the United States.
65 The jurisdictional limitations of tax treaties as applicable to the AJCA provisions is
discussed infra Part IV.A.
66 Customary international law reflects those practices that countries follow because they
feel legally obligated to behave in that way. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987).
67 An individual who is a resident of a treaty country could rely on these customary in-
ternational law arguments in addition to any jurisdictional restrictions set forth in the treaty.
68 The Restatement recognizes three types of jurisdiction: prescriptive (defined in the
text), enforcement (the ability of a country "to induce or compel compliance or to punish
noncompliance with its laws or regulations"), and adjudicative (the ability of a country "to
subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals"). RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987).
But see Cecil J. Olmstead, Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 468 (1989) (criticizing the Re-
statement's addition of the adjudicative category of jurisdiction).
69 In the tax context, jurisdiction to enforce also plays a significant role. The enforce-
ment difficulties associated with the AJCA provisions are discussed infra notes 291-300
and accompanying text. Jurisdiction to adjudicate might also play a significant role with
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stantive laws applicable to particular persons and circumstances. '70 In con-
trast to adjudicative jurisdiction, which focuses on the ability of a court
to adjudicate a particular dispute, prescriptive jurisdiction focuses on the
power of the legislature to make a law apply in certain international con-
texts.
This Part analyzes the extent to which the AJCA citizenship defini-
tions violate the prescriptive jurisdictional principles of customary inter-
national law. The analysis concludes that in certain contexts the tax citi-
zenship definitions violate these jurisdictional limits. Part III then addresses
the relevance, if any, of these customary international law violations un-
der the U.S. Constitution.
A. Prescriptive Jurisdictional Principles
1. Bases for Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Customary international law recognizes several bases that permit a
country to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction. The three most widely recog-
nized bases are territoriality, nationality, and the protective principle.7'
The following analysis briefly summarizes each of these principles then
considers the extent, if any, to which these principles permit the worldwide
taxation of a former citizen (in the nationality law sense) who is treated
as a citizen for tax purposes under the AJCA provisions.
a. Territoriality and Effects
Customary international law recognizes a country's jurisdiction to pre-
scribe law with respect to "conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes
place within its territory" and with respect to persons or things present
within its territory.7 2 In the context of taxation, this territorial-based prin-
ciple generally is referred to as source-based taxation.73 Source-based taxa-
respect to a former citizen living abroad who purportedly is subject to the AJCA provi-
sions. However, even if the United States is able to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
individual because, for example, she visits the United States, the issue regarding prescrip-
tive jurisdiction will remain significant.
7 0 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Pt.
IV, introductory note (1987).
71 See id. § 402(l)-(3). Other jurisdictional bases, which are less widely applied, in-
clude the passive personality principle (involving an act committed outside the country's
territory if the victim is a national of that country) and universality (allowing prosecution
of certain offenses, such as genocide and war crimes, that are universally condemned, even
though there is no link to the country's territory). See id. §§ 402 cmt. g, 404. These juris-
dictional bases are not relevant to the analysis of the AJCA tax provisions.
72 Id. § 402(1).
13 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 6; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Interna-
tional Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483, 490 (2004); Walter Hellerstein, Ju-
risdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Com-
parative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2003). So-called residence-based taxation,
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tion refers to a country imposing tax based on some connection between
the nation's geographic territory and the location of the business activity
or property that gives rise to the income.74 For example, the United States
exercises source-based taxation when it taxes a nonresident alien on income
connected to a U.S. business operation or arising from certain U.S.-source
passive investments.75
Effects-based jurisdiction is closely related to territorial jurisdiction.7 6
The effects principle permits a country to prescribe laws covering conduct
that takes place outside its territory but that has, or is intended to have,
substantial effect within its territory.77 While the effects doctrine has been
recognized for much of the last century in the criminal law area," some
questions still remain regarding the outer boundaries of this principle, par-
ticularly with respect to economic regulation.79 Nonetheless, the United
States has relied extensively on the effects doctrine in applying U.S. anti-
trust laws to conduct outside the United States when that conduct was in-
tended to produce, and actually did produce, a substantial effect in the
United States.8"
b. Nationality
Customary international law also allows a country to prescribe law
with respect to the "activities, interests, status, or relations of its nation-
als outside as well as within its territory."'" This principle, which allows ex-
discussed infra, particularly as applied to non-citizens residing in the United States, has
elements of territoriality, given its focus on the taxpayer's physical presence within the
country's territory. See RAMON J. JEFFERY, THE IMPACT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY ON GLOBAL
TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 45 (1999). However, because residence-based taxa-
tion often involves taxation of extraterritorial income by reason of the personal status of
the taxpayer in relation to the country, it is more generally associated with nationality-
based jurisdiction. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
14 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 7; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 411 (1987).
7 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
7See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1)(c) & cmt. (d) (1987) (categorizing effects-based jurisdiction as a type of territo-
rial jurisdiction). Indeed, effects-based jurisdiction is often referred to as "objective territo-
riality." See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 176 (2001).77 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1) (1987).
71 See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7, 1927).
79 See BEDERMAN, supra note 76, at 177; see also H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterrito-
rial Reach of the U.S. Government's Campaign Against International Bribery, 22 HAST-
INGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 407, 446-47 n.154 (1999) (citing circumstances where "the
doctrine's applicability to instances of solely economic effect within U.S. territory has
been questioned").
10 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993).
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(2) (1987). As a technical matter, the terms "national" and "citizen" are not necessar-
ily synonymous. Nationality is a concept of international law, and has international conse-
quences, such as diplomatic protection and jurisdiction. Id. § 211 cmt. (h) rept. note 6. Citizen-
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traterritorial application of law based on the person's status, has expanded
so that in certain circumstances "[i]nternational law has increasingly rec-
ognized the right of a state to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of domi-
cile or residence, 's2 rather than just nationality. Indeed, in the field of taxa-
tion, it is very common for countries to tax income arising outside of the
country's geographical boundaries if it is earned by a resident of the country
(whether or not the resident is a citizen of the country). While the United
States embraces this broad taxation of its residents,83 it is one of the few
countries in the world that takes full advantage of nationality-based ju-
risdiction to tax the foreign income of its citizens who reside outside the
country. 4 Taxation of income based on the individual's status in relation
to the country, rather than the location of the activities or property giving
rise to the income, is often referred to as residence-based taxation, even
when the taxpayer is a citizen residing abroad. 5
c. Protective Principle
Customary international law also recognizes that a country can pre-
scribe laws regarding "certain conduct outside its territory by persons not
its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a
limited class of other state interests." 6 This principle generally does not
apply in the taxation area. However, it is relevant to the extent the AJCA
provisions are viewed as protecting the United States against one of the
"limited class of other state interests" as contemplated by the principle.
2. Reasonableness Limitation
Even if one of the three above-mentioned bases of jurisdiction ex-
ists, under customary international law a country "may not exercise juris-
diction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connec-
tions with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unrea-
ship is a concept in the nationality law of many countries and generally reflects that subset of
nationals who are entitled to full political rights in the country, such as the right to vote
and hold office. Id. Because the relevant tax provisions focus on citizenship (which implies
nationality), this Article treats the two terms interchangeably.
82 Id. § 402 cmt. (e). The comments in the Restatement explicitly list taxation as an area
where extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction has been expanded to include not only na-
tionals, but also domiciliaries and residents. Id.; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 73, at
484-86 (discussing the expansion of nationality-based taxing jurisdiction to include resi-
dence and domicile); Hellerstein, supra note 73, at 5-6.
13 See supra note 8.
14 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
85 Cf. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 6 (referring to it as "domiciliary ju-
risdiction").
8 6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(3) (1987).
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sonable."87 The determination of whether an exercise of prescriptive ju-
risdiction is reasonable depends on "all relevant factors,"88 including the
extent to which there is a link between the activity and the country; the
connections, such as nationality or residence, between the country and
the person; and the character of the activity to be regulated, its importance to
the country, and the degree to which it is regularly accepted. 9
In the tax context, it is not necessarily unreasonable for a country to
exercise taxing jurisdiction over a person's income merely because another
country exercises jurisdiction over the same income. Indeed, this poten-
tial for double-taxation is a common phenomenon in international taxa-
tion, particularly when one country exercises jurisdiction based on a ter-
ritorial-based source principle and another country exercises nationality
or residence-based jurisdiction over the taxpayer.90 Under such circum-
stances, source-based jurisdiction generally is treated as having a supe-
rior claim, and the country exercising nationality or residence-based taxation
is expected to provide relief from double-taxation. 91
B. Shifting Jurisdictional Basis of Section 877
Before analyzing the extent to which the new AJCA tax definitions
of citizenship violate these jurisdictional principles, it is interesting to
note the extent to which these new definitions reflect a shift in jurisdictional
exercise over individuals who lose citizenship (in a nationality law sense).
Prior to the AJCA, an individual who lost citizenship (under the national-
ity laws) with a principal purpose of tax avoidance became subject to the
alternative tax regime of Internal Revenue Code section 877 for a ten-
year period.92 Even after the enactment of the AJCA, this alternative tax
regime applies to individuals who lose citizenship under the new definition
and whose average income tax liability or net worth exceeds statutory
thresholds.93
7 Id. § 403(1); see also Stephen E. Shay et al., What's Source Got To Do with It? Source
Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 116 n.112 (2002). The Restate-
ment lists relevant factors for determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreason-
able. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(2) (1987); cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818-19 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (relying on the Restatement's reasonableness standards on the grounds that
they "appear fairly supported in the decisions of this Court construing international choice-
of-law principles").
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(2) (1987).
89 Id.
90 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 7.
9' See id. § 413, rept. notes 1, 2. The United States, when exercising nationality or resi-
dence-based taxation, generally provides a tax credit to the extent a foreign country im-
poses tax on foreign-source income. See I.R.C. § 901 (2000).
92 See I.R.C. § 877(a) (LexisNexis 2006).
91 See supra note 18.
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The section 877 alternative tax regime, if applicable, does not provide
that the former citizen is taxable on her worldwide income (as she would
have been had she remained a citizen). Rather, it generally applies the same
source-based taxation that normally applies to nonresident aliens (i.e.,
imposing tax only on income connected to a U.S. business or arising from
certain U.S.-source passive investments).94 In exercising this source-based
taxation, however, it creates a broader definition of U.S. source income
(e.g., capital gain from the sale of stock in a U.S. domestic corporation) than
would ordinarily apply to a nonresident alien. 9
Thus, prior to the AJCA, Congress exercised restraint in taxing indi-
viduals who surrendered citizenship, implicitly avoiding taxation based
on nationality or residence. By enacting a source-based regime, it relied
on broadly accepted territorial principles, merely expanding the types of
income connected to its territory that would be subject to tax in the hands
of certain former citizens. 96 While Congress has continued this exercise
of expanded source-based jurisdiction in some circumstances following
the enactment of the AJCA,97 the new definitions of citizenship for tax pur-
poses reflect a shift in jurisdictional focus in those circumstances when
they apply. In particular, by classifying certain former citizens (in the
nationality law sense) as citizens for tax purposes, and thereby purport-
ing to tax their worldwide income, Congress apparently is trying to in-
voke nationality-based jurisdiction over these individuals. The following
Section examines the extent to which such an expansion of jurisdiction is
justifiable under customary international law.
C. AJCA Jurisdictional Violations
In analyzing whether the AJCA's special definitions of citizenship for
tax purposes satisfy the above-mentioned prescriptive jurisdictional lim-
its under customary international law, it is important to consider each of
the AJCA provisions separately. Under the AJCA provisions, a person who
loses citizenship under the nationality law might be treated as a citizen
for tax purposes following the date on which her loss occurs for national-
ity law purposes under three main circumstances. The first two circum-
stances contemplate a delayed loss of citizenship for tax purposes, while
the third circumstance causes a reacquisition of citizenship for tax purposes.
94 See I.R.C. § 877(b)(1) (cross-referencing the provisions of I.R.C. § 872, which gen-
erally apply to nonresident aliens).
95 See I.R.C. § 877(d)(l)(B).
"For another example of Congress's recognition that it lacked jurisdiction under cus-
tomary international law to tax a nonresident directly on foreign source income, see Avi-
Yonah, supra note 73, at 498 (discussing Congress's structuring of the Foreign Personal
Holding Company and Controlled Foreign Corporation rules in order to comply with its
understanding of the jurisdictional limitations of then-existing customary international
law).
9' See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43
Tax Code as Nationality Law
First, the person might commit a potentially expatriating act (e.g., ob-
taining nationality in another country) with an intent to lose citizenship
but might refrain from notifying either the Department of State or the IRS of
that action. Under such circumstances, the loss of citizenship for nation-
ality law purposes technically occurs on the date the act is committed
with requisite intent, even though the Department of State will not be aware
of the loss and will not be in a position to document that loss. Under new
Internal Revenue Code section 7701(n), the individual remains a citizen
for tax purposes under these circumstances. 98
Second, the person might commit a potentially expatriating act with
an intent to lose citizenship and might notify the Department of State of
the act but fail to notify the IRS as required by section 6039G. Under such
circumstances, the Department of State will document the loss of citizen-
ship retroactively to the date the act was committed.9 9 However, under
new Internal Revenue Code section 7701(n), the individual will remain a
citizen for tax purposes because that statute requires notification of both
the Department of State"° and the IRS in order to lose citizenship status for
tax purposes.' 0'
Third, the person might commit a potentially expatriating act with an
intent to lose citizenship and might notify both the Department of State
and the IRS of the loss of citizenship. Under such circumstances, the in-
dividual will have complied with section 7701(n), and the loss of citizen-
ship will be recognized for tax purposes. If, however, the individual's aver-
age income tax liability or net worth exceeds the section 877(a) statutory
thresholds and the individual is physically present in the United States
for more than thirty days in any of the ten calendar years following citi-
zenship loss, the individual will again be treated as a citizen for tax purposes
during that year pursuant to Internal Revenue Code section 877(g). °2
The relevant question is whether the treatment of the individual as a
citizen for tax purposes in each of these circumstances is within the per-
missible jurisdictional principles of customary international law. 3 For
98 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
'00 Although the statute refers to notification of the "Secretary of State or the Secretary
of Homeland Security," the reference to the Secretary of Homeland Security is directed princi-
pally at long-term residents who are terminating their residency status. See supra note 40.
101 See I.R.C. § 7701(n) (LexisNexis 2006).
10 2 Id. § 877(g); see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
101 The 2003 JCT Report acknowledges as a general matter that "[i]ndefinitely taxing a
nonresident noncitizen on his or her worldwide income . .. would seem to exceed U.S.
taxing jurisdiction and could be viewed as inconsistent with principles of international
taxation." 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 109; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 73, at
498 ("Can a country simply decide to tax nonresidents that have no connection to it on
foreign source income? The answer is clearly no, both from a practical perspective and, I
would argue, from a customary international law perspective."). The 2003 JCT Report,
upon which the AJCA provisions are based, contains a cursory analysis of whether the tax
citizenship provisions violate international law, concluding that they do not interfere with
the right to surrender citizenship but failing to address potential violations of prescriptive
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each potential application of the AJCA provisions, it is sufficient if there
is at least One applicable jurisdictional basis. An application of the AJCA
provisions will exceed permissible jurisdictional limits only if none of
the prescriptive jurisdictional bases justifies the application under the cir-
cumstances.104
1. Territoriality and Effects
a. Section 7701(n)-Failure To Notify
Section 7701(n), which delays the loss of citizenship for tax purposes
until the individual has notified both the Department of State and the IRS,
cannot be justified under territorial jurisdiction principles, regardless of
whether it is applied because of failure to notify the Department of State,
the IRS, or both. Classifying the individual as a citizen for tax purposes
results in taxation not only of income connected to a U.S. business or U.S.-
source passive investments-both of which are legitimate targets of taxa-
tion under territorial principles' 5-but also of foreign-source income that
has no connection to a U.S. business or U.S. investments. 0 6 Moreover, the
individual, particularly if she has notified the Department of State of her
citizenship loss but has not yet notified the IRS, is unlikely to have any
significant connection with U.S. territory. °7 Because section 7701(n) im-
poses tax on persons that are not within U.S. territory with respect to their
business or investment activities that are not connected to U.S. territory,
it is difficult to see any territorial-based justification for taxing the world-
wide income of the individual.
Similarly, the effects-based aspect of territoriality does not justify the
application of worldwide taxation under section 7701(n). As a threshold
matter, it is doubtful that a former citizen residing outside the United States
who fails to file an information statement could be viewed as having a
"substantial" effect on United States territory in years following her ex-
patriation.10 At most, the failure to file an information statement with the
Internal Revenue Service .could be viewed as an attempt to avoid or evade
the extended source-based tax regime of section 877. Even in the unlikely
jurisdiction. See 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19 at 123-25.
104 In general, a country is presumed to have a valid jurisdictional basis for its legisla-
tion, and the burden of proof is on the party asserting that no valid jurisdictional basis exists.
See supra note 76; see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 499 (1996).
105 Indeed, the United States generally taxes nonresident aliens on these types of income.
See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
'06 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
107 Once the Department of State has documented the loss of citizenship, the individual
will be an alien who is subject to the same restrictions on entering the United States as are
other aliens.
108 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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event that this could be viewed as having a substantial effect on the United
States,"° the United States response-imposition of worldwide tax pursu-
ant to the "citizen" label of section 7701(n)-goes well beyond any territo-
rial connection to the United States.
b. Section 877(g)-More than Thirty Days of Physical Presence
In contrast to section 7701(n), which generally involves individuals
who remain outside the United States, section 877(g) applies to individu-
als who have at least some physical connection with U.S. geographic ter-
ritory-i.e., more than 30 days of physical presence in any of the ten post-
expatriation years. Nonetheless, territorial jurisdictional principles do not
support taxation of the worldwide income of such an individual under
section 877(g). Unlike nationality-based jurisdiction, which supports the
taxation of income arising outside a country's territory, territorial-based
principles only permit taxation of income derived from or associated with
the individual's presence or business activities in the country, or derived
from property located in the territory of the country." Because section
877(g) purports to tax the individual on her worldwide income (by reason
of its "citizen" characterization), its broad reach cannot be justified by cus-
tomary international law's territoriality principle of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion.
2. Nationality
a. Section 7701(n)-Failure To Notify Department of State
Nationality-based jurisdictional principles support the application of
section 7701(n) when it is applied due to the individual's failure to notify
the Department of State of the potentially expatriating act. Consider the
example in which an individual commits a potentially expatriating act, such
as obtaining nationality in another country in 2006, and fails to inform a
Department of State consular official of the act and requisite intent until
2010. The Department of State will then, in 2010, document the loss of citi-
zenship retroactive to 2006.1
The relevant question is whether, with respect to that interim period
from 2006 through 2010, the nationality principle provides a jurisdic-
tional basis for the United States to tax the individual's worldwide income.
109 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing potential limitations on cus-
tomary international law effects-based jurisdiction in the economic sphere).
"0 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 412(1)(b) & (c) cmt. a (1987); see also supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
I" This assumes that the individual has not, as a factual matter, traveled on a U.S.
passport or otherwise acted as a U.S. citizen during the intervening period. See supra notes
29-33, 49 and accompanying text.
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Nationality-based taxing jurisdiction is based not only on the inherent rela-
tionship between the country and the individual but also on the benefits
that citizenship provides.112 For example, in Cook v. Tait,'13 the Supreme
Court rejected a taxpayer's assertion that international law prohibits the
taxation of a nondomiciliary citizen's income arising outside the United
States and observed that "the government, by its very nature, benefits the
citizen and his property wherever found, and therefore, has the power to
make the benefit complete [by having authority to collect tax.]"" 4
The benefits rationale underlying nationality-based jurisdiction pro-
vides strong support for allowing application of section 7701(n) to the
individual who delays notifying the Department of State of the expatriat-
"2 See Hellerstein, supra note 73, at 6.
"3265 U.S. 47 (1924).
14 Id. at 56. Edwin R.A. Seligman, a Columbia University economist who played a
leading role in the development of modem international income taxation, observed that nation-
ality-based taxing jurisdiction developed because "political rights involve political duties.
Among them is certainly the duty to pay taxes." EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXA-
TION 111 (1Oth ed. 1931).
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United States v. D'Hotelle de Benitez
Rexach, 558 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977), also recognized the importance of the benefits ration-
ale in determining whether the United States could impose tax for periods when an indi-
vidual's citizenship status was in doubt. That case considered whether the taxpayer was
subject to tax as a citizen for the period between 1949 and her death in 1973. Although her
residence abroad purportedly caused her to lose citizenship in 1949 under the then-existing
nationality law, the Supreme Court's decision in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967),
declared that intent to relinquish citizenship is a necessary prerequisite to citizenship loss,
thereby casting doubt on the taxpayer's earlier loss. The First Circuit (ruling in the tax case
after the taxpayer's death) held that the taxpayer had not lost citizenship by reason of her
1949 actions because she did not have an intent to lose citizenship in 1949. Nonetheless,
the court declared that the taxpayer "cannot be dunned for taxes to support the United
States government during the years in which she was denied its protection." D'Hotelle, 558
F.2d at 43. As a factual matter, the court found that the taxpayer had utilized the benefits of
citizenship from 1949 through 1952 (because her passport had been renewed during that
period), but that as of 1952 both the taxpayer and the Department of State had ceased to
consider her a citizen, and she no longer utilized any benefits of citizenship. Accordingly,
the court held that the taxpayer was subject to tax from 1949 through 1952 but not thereaf-
ter. Id. Although the court's reasoning focused on equity principles, the benefits rationale
reflected therein closely parallels the benefits rationale that arises under customary interna-
tional law's nationality jurisdiction. See U.S. v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 819 (2d Cir.
1976) ("[O]ne gaining governmental benefits on the basis of a representation or asserted posi-
tion is thereafter estopped from taking a contrary position in an effort to escape taxes.").
The IRS has applied a benefits analysis to provide administrative relief to certain tax-
payers whose citizenship was restored retroactively under changes to the immigration laws
after the Department of State had treated them as losing citizenship in the absence of intent
to do so. See Rev. Rul. 92-109, 1992-2 C.B. 3; Rev. Rul. 75-357, 1975-2 C.B. 5 (noting
that tax relief would not be available if the taxpayer had "affirmatively exercised a specific
right of citizenship" during the interim period when citizenship purportedly had been lost);
Rev. Rul. 70-506, 1970-2 C.B. 1. The IRS purported to base these rulings on its discretion-
ary authority regarding the retroactivity of regulations under I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2000), in-
stead of on international law grounds. See R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION AND TAX TREATIES § 24.02[1] (2001) (discussing an IRS policy statement al-
lowing discretionary relief for certain individuals who mistakenly thought they had lost
citizenship, provided, inter alia, that the individual had not affirmatively exercised any
citizenship rights during the relevant period).
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ing act. Despite the Department of State's eventual determination that the
individual's loss of citizenship occurred as of the expatriating act, during
the actual years of that period before the determination the Department of
State would not have contemporaneous knowledge that the individual had
committed the act with the requisite intent. The Department of State would
therefore not be in a position to deny the individual the benefits of citi-
zenship. 5 Because the individual would retain the de facto ability to ob-
tain the benefits of citizenship prior to the time she notified the Depart-
ment of State, the benefits rationale underlying nationality-based taxing
jurisdiction justifies the imposition of tax under section 7701(n) for that
period based on the contemporaneous understanding.
b. Section 7701(n)-Failure To Notify IRS
Assume that the individual commits the potentially expatriating act
in 2006 and notifies the Department of State of the act and expatriating
intent in 2010 but fails to notify the IRS of the citizenship loss as required
by section 6039G. Section 7701(n) would continue to treat the individual
as a U.S. citizen for tax purposes, even though the Department of State has
become aware of the citizenship loss and issues a certificate of loss of na-
tionality.Y6 For example, decades later, the United States could attempt to
subject the individual to income tax or, perhaps more importantly, to es-
tate taxes based on worldwide assets upon her death."' Nationality-based
jurisdiction is much more difficult to justify under these circumstances.
The benefits rationale discussed above does not apply in this situa-
tion. Once the Department of State determines that citizenship was lost pur-
suant to a previously committed act, it will no longer permit the individ-
ual to invoke any benefits of U.S. citizenship. Accordingly, any effort to
tax the individual for periods after 2010 would reflect an attempt to im-
pose a duty associated with citizenship without any of the corresponding
benefits of citizenship.
More fundamentally, once the Department of State has been notified
of the expatriating act and makes a determination of loss of citizenship,
the individual can no longer be considered a national as that term is used
in customary international law, and nationality-based jurisdiction is inap-
plicable for subsequent periods."' Although customary international law
"I If questioned about the prior potentially expatriating act, the individual presumably
could claim that the act was performed without intent to lose citizenship. As long as the consu-
lar official was not aware of any evidence to the contrary, the official would accept the
individual's assertion. See supra text accompanying note 30. Of course, if the individual
actually exercised these rights during the interim period, it would undercut a subsequent
claim that the potentially expatriating act had been performed with an intent to lose citi-
zenship. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 12.
's Although customary international law extends nationality-based taxing jurisdiction
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does not define who is a "national" and generally leaves that determina-
tion to the internal law of each country," 9 a country cannot merely label a
person as a national (or citizen) for purposes of a narrow context, such as
taxation, and thereby subject her to the duties that arise. 20 International law
contemplates some basic parameters of the nationality definition. In par-
ticular:
[N]ationality is a continuing legal relationship between the sov-
ereign State on the one hand and the citizen on the other. The fun-
damental basis of a man's nationality is his membership in an
independent political community. This legal relationship involves
rights and corresponding duties upon both-on the part of the citi-
zen no less than on the part of the State. 2 '
By classifying the person as a "citizen" for tax purposes, section
7701(n) does not purport to establish nationality in this international law
sense. It creates no rights typically associated with nationality. It merely
purports to impose one particular obligation often associated with national-
ity-the burden of worldwide taxation--on a person who no longer has na-
tionality (or the benefits thereof) either under U.S. nationality law or in
to include the taxation of residents, see supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text, this
aspect of nationality-based jurisdiction does not apply in the current circumstances. Sec-
tion 7701(n) can apply even if the individual never returns to the United States and there-
fore could not be considered a U.S. resident. See I.R.C. § 7701(n) (LexisNexis 2006).
'
19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 211 cmt. c (1987). Although countries are given wide latitude in defining who is a na-
tional, under international law "other states need not recognize a nationality that is not based
on an accepted 'genuine link."' Id. § 211 (internal citation omitted). Universally accepted
"genuine links" for establishing nationality include nationality conferred by reason of birth
in a state's territory (jus soli) or of birth to parents who are nationals (jus sanguinis). Id.
§ 211 cmt. c. In addition, voluntary naturalization generally is recognized as long as the
individual has at least some ties to the state before naturalization, such as a period of resi-
dence. Id. The application of section 7701(n) in the present context does not establish or
recognize "nationality" in the international law sense, so the question of whethe'r there is a
genuine link is not reached.
I20 The 2003 JCT Report, upon which the AJCA provisions are based, attempts to jus-
tify section 7701(n) based on a country's ability to create evidentiary standards for deter-
mining when citizenship is lost. See 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 124. The Report
cites Congress's ability to "require reasonable evidentiary standards, such as the filing of
an IRS form, as a requirement for loss of citizenship." Id. The Report, however, takes the
concept of evidentiary standards out of context. While Congress does indeed have the abil-
ity to adopt evidentiary standards for determining when a person loses citizenship under
the nationality laws, under section 7701(n) a failure to file the requisite tax form does not
affect the individual's citizenship status under the nationality laws. See supra notes 29-35
and accompanying text. At most, the JCT Report's focus on evidentiary standards would jus-
tify Congress in changing the nationality law itself to deny loss of citizenship for national-
ity law purposes until the proper tax form is completed.
121 Re Lynch, Ann. Dig. Of Pub. Int'l Law Cases, 1929-30 221, 223, quoted in I.A.
SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (1 1th ed. 1994); see also Nottebohm Case
(Liech. v. Guat.) (second phase), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 5) (noting reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions of nationality).
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the international law sense. Unlike the situation discussed in the prior Sec-
tion, where section 7701(n) imposes the tax burden of citizenship for a pe-
riod when the benefits of citizenship are de facto available contempora-
neously to the individual, section 7701(n) continues a significant obliga-
tion associated with nationality for periods when the corresponding rights
and benefits of citizenship have already been extinguished under U.S.
nationality laws. Because section 7701(n) in this context purports to impose
citizenship-based taxation for periods when there is no nationality in the
customary international law sense, it cannot be justified under national-
ity-based jurisdictional principles.'22 This conclusion is made even stronger
by the fact that the United States' practice of imposing worldwide taxa-
tion based on citizenship is viewed as pushing the limits of acceptable state
practice even when the taxpayer is a national in the customary international
law sense.123
c. Section 877(g)-More than Thirty Days of Physical Presence
For the same reasons, section 877(g) cannot be justified on pure nation-
ality-based jurisdictional grounds. Although section 877(g) classifies cer-
tain individuals 2 4 as "citizens" for tax purposes if they spend more than
thirty days in the United States during one of the ten calendar years im-
mediately following citizenship loss, that status does not constitute na-
tionality as that term is used under customary international law.
Nonetheless, another interpretation of the provision might justify the
use of nationality-based taxing jurisdiction. In the context of taxation,
customary international law has expanded the idea of nationality-based
jurisdiction to include jurisdiction based on an individual's residence or
domicile.'25 Although section 877(g) classifies an individual to whom it
applies as a "citizen" for tax purposes, 2 6 in order to provide the most defer-
ential analysis of the statute's validity under customary international law
22ee RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 211 cmt. a (1987) (noting the link between nationality, as the term is used in customary
international law, and nationality-based prescriptive jurisdiction). Moreover, because the
individual is not physically in the United States, it cannot be justified under the residence-
based extension of nationality jurisdiction. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
23 See supra notes 82-83.
124 As discussed supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text, section 877(g) generally
applies to an individual whose citizenship loss has been recognized for both nationality
law and tax purposes, whose average income tax liability or net worth on the date of citi-
zenship loss exceeded statutory thresholds, and who is physically present in the United
States for more than thirty days during any of the ten post-expatriation years.
2I See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
126 Section 877(g) provides that an individual to whom it applies "shall be treated ...
as a citizen or resident of the United States, as the case may be," for the relevant year.
I.R.C. § 877(g)(1) (LexisNexis 2006). In context, this language indicates that a person who
previously lost citizenship is treated as a "citizen' under this provision, and a person who
previously lost long-term residency status (i.e., having held a green card for at least eight
of the prior fifteen years) is treated as a "resident" under this provision. Id.
20061
Harvard Journal on Legislation
the following analysis assumes that the statute is treating the individual
as a resident. This assumption is justified by the fact that the statute's appli-
cation depends on the number of days of physical presence (a concept
often associated with residence), and worldwide taxation generally would
result from the application of the statute regardless of whether the indi-
vidual is labeled a "citizen" or a "resident."'27
No uniform definition of residence exists. Instead, "[tlhe concept of
residence as applied for tax purposes varies considerably among states. It
usually refers, however, to the personal connection an individual has with
a particular territory."'28 One commentator summarized the acceptable range
of definitions as follows:
An important element in most definitions of residence is presence
in the jurisdiction for a specified length of time: often 183 days
or more in the taxable year .... Sometimes presence in prior
years is also taken into account. Although some countries rely on
the physical presence test exclusively . . . , many-particularly
OECD countries-have additional reasons for which someone can
be considered a resident, including status as a permanent resi-
dent for immigration purposes, domicile, having an habitual place
of abode, and so forth.' 29
The United States has adopted several of these elements. 3 ° The United
States' "substantial presence" test sets a lower threshold for residence than
do most countries that use a physical presence test (typically 183 days in
the current year). ' 3' The United States also treats a person as a resident for
income tax purposes if she holds a green card. 3 2 For estate and gift tax
purposes, the United States generally uses the subjective common law
127 Although citizens and resident aliens generally are subject to the same tax rules un-
der the Internal Revenue Code, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1974), there
are some isolated circumstances where their treatment differs, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 91 l(d)(1)
(2000) (providing the definition of a "qualified individual" who is eligible for the foreign
earned income exclusion). Even if section 877(g) cannot be read as a matter of statutory
interpretation to impose residence-based taxation on the former citizen, the analysis in the
text is important. If customary international law would permit residence-based taxation under
the circumstances, while not allowing nationality-based jurisdiction, Congress presumably
could change the statute so that a former citizen to whom section 877(g) applies is treated
as a "resident" for tax purposes.
128 RICHARD L. DOERNBERG ET AL., ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
TAXATION 74 (2001).
129 VICTOR THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW 289 (2003); see also DOERNBERG, SU-
pra note 128, at 74.
130 See generally supra note 9 (discussing U.S. rules for determining tax residency).
" ' See RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 114, 6.8 n.29 ("[A] typical definition of resi-
dence is physical presence in the state for seven months or more during the taxable year.").
32 See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
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domicile test, rather than a physical presence test, for determining resi-
dence.'33
In the present section 877(g) context, the relevant question is whether a
former citizen's physical presence in the United States for only 31 days
during a calendar year is sufficient to justify worldwide taxation under resi-
dency jurisdiction principles. While customary international law does not
specify a bright-line 183-days-per-year rule for countries that rely on a
physical presence test-indeed, the United States' weighted substantial pres-
ence formula sets a slightly lower standard by including a portion of the
days in the two preceding years-customary international law does seem
to establish a threshold in that general range. 34 A test triggered by only
31 days of physical presence in a single year is substantially below the typi-
cal 183-day test used by most countries that rely on a physical presence
test.135
In short, none of the commonly accepted physical presence-based tests
of residence support a hairtrigger 31-day standard for making a person a
tax resident who is thereby subject to worldwide taxation. Indeed, the sec-
tion 877 standard is well below any commonly accepted standard. More-
over, the more subjective common law domicile standard often used as a
residence test, which involves a subjective intent to remain indefinitely,'36
provides even less support for allowing 31 days of physical presence to
constitute residence.
The "reasonableness" requirement of customary international law ju-
risdiction provides another impediment to justifying section 877(g) on resi-
dence grounds. As noted above, even if a country has jurisdiction to pre-
scribe under one of the customary bases, that jurisdiction may not be exer-
cised in an unreasonable way.'37 The Restatement commentary specifically
addresses this limitation in the residence-based taxation context. The com-
mentary observes that "a tax on a nonresident alien temporarily present
within a state, measured by his worldwide income, could be challenged
as a violation of international law."' 38 A similar concern was raised by one of
the leading figures in the development of the modern U.S. income tax,
who observed that "[tlemporary residence is plainly inadmissible as a test"
for residence-based taxing jurisdiction.'39 Given the gross disparity be-
"' See Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1(b) (as amended in 1994).
134 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 129 & 131 and accompanying text.
136 See Treas. Reg. § 20.01-(b)(1) (as amended in 1994).
"I See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(1) (1987); see also supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing reason-
ableness limitation).
1
38 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 411 cmt. d (1987).
"9 SELIGMAN, supra note 114, at 112. Professor Seligman observed that "[i]f a traveler
chances to spend a week in a town just when the tax collector comes around, there is no
good reason why he should be assessed on his whole property by this particular town; the
relations between him and the government are too slight." Id.
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tween a 31-day threshold and the thresholds generally used by countries
to define residence, the 31-day standard of section 877(g) appears to be
much closer to the "temporarily present" concept referred to in the Restate-
ment commentary, for which worldwide taxation is not permitted.
The reasonableness limitation is particularly relevant given the un-
derlying purposes of allowing residence-based taxing jurisdiction. The U.S.
Supreme Court has noted that the "universally recognized" principle al-
lowing residence-based taxation of extraterritorial income is based on the
individual's "[e]njoyment of the privileges of residence in the State and
the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws," noting that these
are "inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs of government."''
An individual who spends close to half the year or more in a state-as the
tests based on 183 days of physical presence contemplate-indeed has
enjoyed significant privileges in that state. In contrast, an individual who
has spent only 31 days in a country has enjoyed significantly fewer privi-
leges and protections in that country, particularly when those limited privi-
leges and protections are used as a justification to tax the individual's
worldwide income for the entire year, as is the case under section 877(g).
Thus, in the case of a person who is subjected to worldwide taxation
under section 877(g) by reason of spending only 31 days in the United
States during one of the ten post-expatriation years, the imposition of tax
most likely would violate customary international law. If, in contrast, the
person triggers section 877(g) by reason of spending significantly more
time in the United States-for example, 160 days in a single year during
the post-expatriation period-the case against taxing jurisdiction is much
weaker. Whereas the large gulf between 31 days and 183 days makes a
conclusion of unreasonableness somewhat easier, the difference between
160 days and the commonly accepted 183-day period is much less.' 4' Ac-
cordingly, the question of whether the application of section 877(g) vio-
lates customary international law might depend on the specific facts of the
case-in particular, how many days of physical presence the individual
actually had in the United States. The strongest case for finding a viola-
tion of customary law exists for an individual who is physically present
in only a single year during the ten-year period and barely exceeds the 31-
day threshold in that year. Under such circumstances, worldwide taxation
based on residence would be extremely difficult to justify under customary
140 New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937); see also Hellerstein,
supra note 73, at 5-6. In this regard, the rationale is similar to the benefits rationale under-
lying citizenship-based jurisdiction. See id. at 6.
14' At the extreme, consider an individual who had 120 days of physical presence in
each of three consecutive years within the ten-year period after citizenship loss. Such an
individual would just fail to be treated as a resident under the weighted average substantial
presence test. See supra note 9. Given how close the individual was to meeting the ac-
cepted U.S. residency standard, it would be very difficult to argue that the imposition of
section 877(g) would violate customary international law's residence-based standards.
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international law jurisdictional principles and the reasonableness limita-
tions.
3. Protective Principle
The final potential jurisdictional basis considered-the protective
principle-does not justify taxation under either section 770 1(n) or sec-
tion 877(g). Customary international law recognizes that a country can pre-
scribe laws regarding "certain conduct outside its territory by persons not
its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a lim-
ited class of other state interests."'42 The principle generally permits a state
to punish offenses, such as:
offenses directed against the security of the state or other offenses
threatening the integrity of governmental functions that are gen-
erally recognized as crimes by developed legal systems, e.g., es-
pionage, counterfeiting of the state's seal or currency, falsification
of official documents, as well as perjury before consular officials,
and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws.1 43
The interests implicated by sections 7701(n) and 877(g) fall far short
of this "limited class" of offenses against state interests for which the
protective principle can be invoked. The principal interests that sections
7701(n) and 877(g) protect against are perceived abuses of citizenship re-
nunciation to achieve tax savings.' In particular, the sections are di-
rected at people who either fail to notify the Department of State of the ex-
patriating act immediately, or subsequently re-enter the United States, pre-
sumably on a legal basis,'45 in future years. However, none of these con-
cerns rises to the level of an offense "generally recognized as crimes by
developed legal systems. 14 6 Indeed, none of them is even a crime under
U.S. law. 147 Moreover, the act underlying the purported abuse-i.e., the re-
142 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(3) (1987).
143 Id. § 402 cmt. f.
144 See supra notes 41-50, 60-62 and accompanying text.
141 Although the Reed Amendment, enacted in 1996, purports to deny future admit-
tance to a former citizen who lost citizenship for tax purposes, that provision has never
been enforced, and the enactment of section 877(g) appears to be an acknowledgment by
Congress that it will not be enforced in any meaningful way. See supra note 62; cf Kirsch,
supra note 12, at 881-83.
146 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 cmt. f (1987).
147 The nationality laws continue to treat an individual as losing citizenship at the time
she voluntarily commits a potentially expatriating act with an intent to lose citizenship. See
8 U.S.C. § 1481; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Reed
Amendment, restricting the admissibility of former citizens whose loss of citizenship was
tax-motivated, has never been enforced. See supra note 145.
2006]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
nunciation of citizenship-is generally considered to be a protected right
under customary international law. 148 Finally, while worldwide taxation
based on citizenship is recognized as legitimate under international law,
it is generally viewed with disfavor by many countries.'49 For these reasons,
an argument that sections 877(g) and 7701(n) are justified by the protec-
tive principle of taxing jurisdiction is not persuasive.
4. Consequences
Based on the foregoing analysis, the strongest case for the existence
of valid taxing jurisdiction under customary international law applies
when a person commits a potentially expatriating act (e.g., obtaining na-
tionality in another country) with an intent to lose citizenship but refrains
from notifying the Department of State. Under such circumstances, sec-
tion 7701(n) can be justified under nationality-based principles, particu-
larly given the contemporaneous potential availability of citizenship benefits
prior to notifying the Department of State.
In contrast, section 7701(n) is not justifiable under nationality-based
principles when applied to periods after the individual has informed the
Department of State of the citizenship loss but before she has complied with
the IRS reporting requirements of section 6039G. Moreover, territorial
principles and the protection principles do not justify worldwide taxation
under these circumstances.
The validity of section 877(g) depends on the particular circumstances
in which it is applied. To the extent that it is applied to a person who is
physically present in the United States for a significant number of days dur-
ing a relevant year-e.g., a number that narrowly fails to trigger the sub-
stantial presence test-the application of the statute most likely is a valid
exercise of residence-based jurisdiction. However, at the other extreme, if
an individual's physical presence barely trips the section 877(g) thresh-
old-e.g., a number close to the 31-day minimum in only a single year of
the ten-year post-expatriation period-the application of the statute to im-
pose worldwide taxation might not be justified under residence-based juris-
dictional principles, particularly given the reasonableness limitation thereon.
Moreover, territorial principles and the protection principles would not
justify worldwide taxation under such circumstances.
It is important to note that a taxpayer may not have any effective rem-
edy with respect to these potential international law violations. If the United
States seeks to apply section 877(g) or 7701(n) against an individual in
148 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 211 cmt. d. Indeed, the United States has a long history, dating back to the War of 1812,
of supporting a person's right under international law to renounce citizenship. See gener-
ally Kirsch, supra note 12, at 903 n.183 (discussing historical basis of right to renounce
citizenship).
149 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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violation of the prescriptive jurisdictional limits of customary international
law, no international judicial forum is available in which the individual
(or the individual's new country of nationality 5 °) can seek relief. Although
the International Court of Justice generally hears disputes involving vio-
lations of customary international law, the United States withdrew its
consent to compulsory jurisdiction to that court in 1986.151 Accordingly,
in the event the United States seeks to assert tax liability against the indi-
vidual, her only direct legal recourse would be a constitutional challenge
in U.S. courts. 52
Various indirect responses may be available for violations of cus-
tomary international law. 5 For example, the individual's new state of na-
tionality might make a formal diplomatic protest against the United States if
the United States seeks to tax the individual in violation of customary inter-
national law.'54 Moreover, the new state of nationality could pursue uni-
lateral countermeasures against the United States for the jurisdictional viola-
tion, provided that such actions are in proportion to the United States'
violation.'55 However, none of these responses is likely to provide any prac-
tical benefit to the taxpayer.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
While the international law violations discussed in the preceding Part
may create problems for the United States in its international relations,5 6
they do not provide the taxpayer with any direct legal remedy.
This Part considers the extent to which an individual might be able to
challenge the new provisions under the U.S. Constitution. In so doing, it
focuses on the circumstance that most clearly violates customary interna-
150 In general, obligations of customary international law run between states, and it is
the responsibility of each state to seek redress on behalf of its nationals. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 902(2), cmt. i. But see
id. § 906 cmt. a ("[Flew international agreements have given private persons access to an
international forum where the agreement establishing the forum allows such extension of
its jurisdiction.").
"I' See 85 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 82 (1985).
152 The constitutional issues raised by the AJCA provisions are discussed in the next
Part. There are other significant practical considerations of relevance to the taxpayer, par-
ticularly with respect to potential difficulties the United States might face in enforcing
collection of taxes in the international context. See infra notes 291-300 and accompanying
text.
,53 Any such claims generally may be made only if the individual's attempt for relief
through U.S. courts is unsuccessful. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 902 cmt. k.
'
5 4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 902.
'55 See id. § 902 cmt. d. The countermeasures could only be directed against the United
States itself, not against U.S. nationals. Id. § 905 cmt. b. Thus, the other country could not
retaliate by attempting to impose taxes against U.S. nationals in a manner that violated juris-
dictional principles.
156 See infra Part IV.
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tional law jurisdictional principles; the continued treatment of a person
as a tax citizen under section 7701(n) for periods after the individual has
informed the Department of State of her citizenship loss but before she
has complied with the IRS reporting requirements of section 6039G. In
this circumstance, the Department of State has already documented that
the individual is no longer a citizen under the nationality law and is no
longer entitled to the benefits of citizenship. Yet, as a "tax citizen," her
worldwide income continues to be taxable for decades and, upon her death,
she could be subject to U.S. estate tax on her worldwide assets.
A. General Principles
The interplay of customary international law and the U.S. Constitu-
tion raises many noteworthy issues. For example, significant academic de-
bate has addressed the extent, if any, to which the substantive rules of cus-
tomary international law constitute federal common law, thereby creating
subject matter jurisdiction for federal courts and potentially preempting
inconsistent state laws. 57 In addition, recent Supreme Court opinions have
raised issues regarding the extent to which international norms are rele-
vant in interpreting constitutional standards, such as the term "cruel and
unusual punishments" under the Eighth Amendment as applied to state
death penalty provisions.'58
This Article does not address these general debates. Rather, it focuses
on potential constitutional limits under the Constitution on Congress's abil-
ity to impose worldwide taxation on former citizens pursuant to the new
tax-specific definitions of citizenship. In particular, it considers whether
the new provisions exceed Congress's taxing power under Article I of the
157 In particular, these debates focus on the modem validity, if any, of the Supreme
Court's famous observation that "[i]nternational law is part of our law," The Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), and the extent to which customary international law con-
stitutes federal common law after the Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). Compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary Inter-
national Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 815 (1997) (arguing that customary international law is general common law that was
abrogated by Erie and does not have the status of post-Erie federal common law), with
Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response
to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997), and Beth
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997) (defending the "modern" position that customary interna-
tional law can constitute federal common law). See generally Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out
the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365 (2002).
"I' See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (considering international norms
in holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of juveniles under age eight-
een); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (considering the view of the "world
community" in holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of mentally re-
tarded individuals). But see Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the practices of other countries are irrelevant in interpreting the Eighth Amendment).
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Constitution or violate other constitutional limitations, such as the due
process and equal protection principles under the Fifth Amendment. 5 9
Constitutional challenges to federal tax statutes face difficult hur-
dles. As many commentators have observed,16° since the enactment of the
Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, federal tax statutes repeatedly have with-
stood challenges brought on constitutional grounds. Nonetheless, as the
following analysis demonstrates, the AJCA definitions of tax citizenship,
at least as applicable in certain circumstances, may cross the boundaries of
constitutional permissibility.
As a threshold matter, it should be noted that a federal statute that
violates customary international law is not necessarily unconstitutional.1 6
The United States generally has a dualist system in which national law and
international law are considered separate and distinct legal systems, with
international law having applicability only to the extent it is incorporated
or transformed into national law. 162 Even those scholars who claim that
customary international law rises to the status of federal common law gener-
ally recognize that Congress has the ability to alter that law by statute.
Accordingly, the violation of prescriptive jurisdiction under customary in-
ternational law discussed in the prior Part is relevant to this Part's consti-
tutional analysis only indirectly. In particular, the violation is relevant to
the analysis of Congress's taxing powers only to the extent that Article I in-
corporates prescriptive jurisdictional limitations of customary interna-
tional law. The violation is even less relevant to the potential due process
and equal protection limitations, except to the extent that the same con-
cerns underlying the customary international law prescriptive jurisdictional
limitations might have relevance to the constitutional limitations.
159 Cf. A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?,
35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379 (1997) (distinguishing between Congress's power to
legislate extraterritorially and an individual's Fifth Amendment rights that might preclude
application of that legislation).
16' See, e.g., JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, U.S. TAXATION OF FOR-
EIGN PERSONS AND FOREIGN INCOME 1.5.1; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at
1; Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal Government,
41 TAX LAw 3, 4 (1987). But see Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) (including transfer
in gross estate for estate tax purposes violated Due Process when transfer had been com-
pleted prior to 1916 enactment of the estate tax).
161 Indeed, Congress may constitutionally override a treaty obligation of the United States,
even though the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, explicitly refers to treaties
(along with federal statutes) as the supreme law of the land. See infra notes 279-284 and
accompanying text. In contrast to its explicit reference to treaties, the Supremacy Clause
does not explicitly mention customary international law.162 See BEDERMAN, supra note 76, at 151-53. In contrast, a monist system treats inter-
national law and national law as parts of the same legal system, with international law
having a higher prescriptive value than national law. Id. at 151.
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B. Congressional Authority
* The Constitution grants Congress broad taxing powers. Article I pro-
vides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Du-
ties, Imposts and Excises." '163 Although the text of the Constitution pro-
vides one express exception1" and two express limitations'65 to this taxing
authority, none of those restrictions applies in the current context. Accord-
ingly, the threshold inquiry is whether the general grant of taxing author-
ity in Article I permits Congress to tax the worldwide income (or world-
wide estate) of individuals treated as tax citizens under section 7701(n)
many years after having lost citizenship under the nationality laws.
Courts generally have interpreted the Constitution's taxing power very
broadly. The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions rejected argu-
ments that Congress lacked the constitutional authority under Article I to
enact a particular tax."6 Indeed, some Supreme Court dicta implies that
the authority knows no limits.1
67
However, these broad statements regarding taxing authority gener-
ally arise in domestic situations where the focus is on the particular type of
tax involved instead of in an international setting where there are ques-
tions of jurisdiction to tax a particular individual. In those cases involv-
ing Congress's authority to impose taxes in an international setting, the
Supreme Court has been less inclined to rely on flat assertions of unlimited
authority under the Article I taxing power clause. Instead, the Supreme
Court, while upholding all constitutional challenges to Congress's taxing
163 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
164 Congress may not impose any tax or duty on an export from a state. Id. art. I, § 9,
cl. 5.
165 All duties, impost, and excise taxes must be uniform throughout the United States, id.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, and any capitation or other "direct" tax must be apportioned among the
states in proportion to their population. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. The former restriction is not
relevant in the present circumstances. With respect to the latter restriction, the Sixteenth
Amendment makes clear that an income tax is not a direct tax within the meaning of the
apportionment clause. See id. amend. XVI. The Supreme Court has observed that the Six-
teenth Amendment did not augment Congress's power to tax, but merely eliminated the
apportionment requirement. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1916); see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 n.13 (1988); William E. Peck
& Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1918).
166 See, e.g., Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916) (upholding tax on in-
come of a mining company); Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12-26 (upholding tax on corporate
income); see also infra notes 168-184 and accompanying text (citing cases upholding
taxes imposed in international context).
167 For example, in upholding a nineteenth-century federal license tax on selling alco-
hol and lottery tickets, the Court stated that, apart from the export exception and the appor-
tionment and uniformity limitations, the federal taxing power "reaches every subject, and
may be exercised at discretion." License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867).
Similarly, in upholding various challenges to an income tax enacted shortly after the ratifica-
tion of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Court declared that congressional taxing power "is
exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation," and that this proposition
"has been so often authoritatively declared as to render it necessary only to state the doc-
trine." Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12.
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authority in the international sphere, has analyzed Congress's authority in
a broader context. As discussed below, the Court repeatedly has justified
Congressional authority to tax in the international context by reference to
international prescriptive jurisdictional standards, implying that the Arti-
cle I taxing authority granted to Congress, while encompassing the full
power granted to a sovereign country, is nonetheless limited to the taxing
power that sovereign countries enjoy under international law.
In United States v. Bennett,'68 the Supreme Court upheld Congress's
authority to impose an excise tax with respect to a U.S. citizen's ownership
and use of a yacht outside of U.S. territorial waters. 69 The Court first distin-
guished the taxing power of Congress from the more limited taxing power
of the states, stating that congressional power "is coextensive with the
limits of the United States; it knows no restriction except where one is ex-
pressed in or arises from the Constitution and therefore embraces all the
attributes which appertain to sovereignty in the fullest sense."' 170 Although
this language might imply almost unlimited congressional power, the Court
then elaborated on the taxing "attributes which appertain to sovereignty."
The Court did not reject outright the limitation on taxing sovereignty pro-
posed by the taxpayer-"that the power to tax [is] limited by the capacity
of the taxing government to afford that benefit and protection which is
the true basis of the right to tax . . ,"I" Rather, the Court implicitly ac-
knowledged this limitation on the inherent taxing authority of sovereign
nations but noted that the taxpayer's "confusion of thought consists in mis-
taking the scope and extent of the sovereign power of the United States
as a nation and its relation to its citizens and their relations to it."'72 In par-
ticular, the Court concluded that the standard was satisfied because the
federal government "by its very nature benefit[s] the citizen and his property
wherever found."'173
In the landmark Cook v. Tait decision, 174 the Court addressed the scope
of Congress's taxing power under the income tax, holding that Congress
has authority to tax a U.S. citizen residing abroad on income arising from
foreign sources. 175 The Court noted the need to "make further exposition
of the national power as the case depends upon it.' 1 76 The Court then
quoted extensively from Bennett, particularly with reference to the link be-
tween the power to tax and the benefits of citizenship, concluding that the
"power in its scope and extent ... is based on the presumption that gov-
ernment by its very nature benefits the citizen and his property wherever
168 232 U.S. 299 (1914).
169 Id. at 307.
170 Id. at 306.
171 Id. at 307.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
175 Id. at 56.
176 Id. at 55.
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found." '177 The Cook Court then summarized the Bennett principle, observ-
ing:
In other words, the principle was declared that the government,
by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever
found and, therefore, has the power to make the benefit complete.
Or to express it another way, the basis of the power to tax was not
and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property in
all cases, it being in or out of the United States, and was not and
cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that
being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen
to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as citi-
zen.
178
In Burnet v. Brooks, 179 the most recent of the relevant Supreme Court
cases addressing congressional taxing authority in an international con-
text, the Court focused on Congress's taxing power with respect to non-
citizens who reside outside the United States. In Brooks, the decedent was
an alien residing abroad who, at the time of his death, owned bonds and
stock certificates that were physically located in the United States. The
Court concluded that Congress had the power to impose the estate tax with
respect to these securities.18° In addressing the power to impose the tax,
the Court explicitly concluded that "[w]e determine national power [to
tax] in relation to other countries and their subjects by applying the prin-
ciples of jurisdiction recognized in international relations."'81 The Court
engaged in a lengthy analysis of the nation's inherent sovereign taxing pow-
ers, 182 stating that:
So far as our relation to other nations is concerned, and apart from
any self-imposed constitutional restriction, we cannot fail to re-
gard the property in question as being within the jurisdiction of
the United States,-that is, it was property within the reach of the
power which the United States by virtue of its sovereignty could
exercise as against other nations and their subjects without vio-
lating any established principle of international law. 183
After mentioning the traditional jurisdictions to tax recognized by inter-
national law, such as citizenship, domicile, source of income, or situs of
117 Id. at 56.
178 Id.
179 288 U.S. 378 (1933).
180 Id. at 396.
181 Id. at 405-06 (emphasis added).
182 See id. at 396-400.
113 Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
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property, the Court stated that "the sovereign taxing power as exerted by
governments in the exercise of jurisdiction [can be based] upon any one
of these grounds."' ' 4
None of these three cases addressing the reach of Congress's taxing
powers relied on the apparently broad language in Article I, section 8 of
the Constitution, although the government's counsel in Cook explicitly in-
vited the Court to do so.8 5 The Court instead positioned the federal tax-
ing power within the broader context of the United States' rights as a sover-
eign nation. 8 6 The analysis in the three cases implies that Congress's Ar-
ticle I taxing power, although it encompasses the full measure of a sover-
eign's taxing power, cannot exceed the power that a sovereign enjoys
under international law.'87 While the particular exercises of taxing power
in those three cases fell within accepted taxing jurisdictional bases and
thus were held valid,'8 8 the Court's rationale implies that a tax statute with
no jurisdictional basis would be invalid.
As discussed in Part II.C, the application of Internal Revenue Code
section 7701(n) to impose worldwide income (or worldwide estate) taxation
on a former citizen who had notified the Department of State of her citi-
zenship loss decades earlier but had failed to notify the IRS cannot be sup-
ported under customary international law jurisdictional principles. 8 9 Ac-
18 Id. at 399; see also Comm'r v. Nevious, 76 F.2d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1935) (citing
Brooks to conclude that "[t]he United States has jurisdiction to tax when it can lay hold of
either the obligor or the obligee of a chose in action"); McDougall v. Comm'r, 45 B.T.A.
803, 809-10 (1941) (citing Brooks's reliance on "the principles of jurisdiction recognized in
international relations" to hold that Congress can impose worldwide estate tax based on the
decedent's U.S. domicile).
"I Brief for Defendant in Error at 3, Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (No. 220). In-
deed, the government counsel's principal argument was based on the assertion in the Li-
cense Tax Cases that the taxing power under Article I "reaches every subject, and may be
exercised at discretion." License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867).
1'86 Cook, 265 U.S. at 56.
"I One additional Supreme Court case supports the foregoing analysis. In United
States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819), the Court held that no federal customs duties
were owed with respect to a period when a U.S. port was under British occupation during
the War of 1812. The Court stated that the British had "acquired that firm possession which
enabled [them] to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty over that place [and the] sover-
eignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended." Id. at 254. The
Court then observed that the port "was, therefore, during this period, so far as respected our
revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port; and goods imported into it by the inhabitants
were subject to such duties only as the British government chose to require." Id. While the
Rice case admittedly involved unusual facts, the Court's reasoning implies that Congress's
seemingly broad powers to impose duties under Article I, section 8 are subject to the juris-
dictional restraints generally applicable to a sovereign under international law.
I The taxes in Bennett and Cook were upheld on nationality-based principles, while
the tax in Brooks was upheld based on the property's situs in U.S. territory. United States
v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 307 (1914); Cook, 265 U.S. at 56; Brooks, 288 U.S. at 405.
189 Even to the extent the provision is viewed as a method for preventing tax avoidance
or evasion, such a rationale would only justify taxing jurisdiction tailored to the extended
source-based taxation of the section 877 alternative tax regime, not ongoing worldwide
taxation. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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cordingly, such an application would present the strongest case for con-
stitutional challenge under the foregoing analysis.'90
It is important to acknowledge that these cases addressing Congress's
jurisdictional powers to impose tax were decided more than seventy years
ago during the pre-Erie and Lochner eras and prior to the Court's explicit
acknowledgment of broad legislative jurisdiction in certain non-tax areas. 191
Nonetheless, by the time these tax cases were decided, the Court's views
regarding Congress's prescriptive jurisdiction in an international context
had already undergone significant evolution and expansion. Whereas early
nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases reflected a natural law-based
focus on territorial jurisdictional limitations, 92 by the time of the Cook v.
Tait decision in 1924 and Brooks in 1933, the Court had shown a significant
willingness to expand the limits of Congress's international prescriptive
jurisdiction beyond the constraints of nineteenth-century jurisprudence.'93
Accordingly, the Court's tax decisions quoted above, with their limiting
language regarding Congress's legislative jurisdiction, cannot be wholly
dismissed as merely reflecting the views of a bygone era.
While some non-tax lines of cases might provide support for a broad
interpretation of Congress's powers in an international context, these cases
are distinguishable from the present circumstances. For example, the Su-
preme Court has often upheld the extraterritorial application of federal
statutes in non-tax areas. While the Court applies a presumption that Con-
gress does not intend for statutes to apply extraterritorially, 194 the Court
permits extraterritorial application of federal law when congressional intent
to do so is sufficiently clear.' 95 By focusing on Congress's intent, the
190 In contrast, the application of section 7701(n) in the case of an individual who has
notified neither the Department of State nor the IRS of the expatriating act does not violate
the prescriptive jurisdictional principles of customary international law, see supra notes
111-115 and accompanying text, and therefore would not be subject to constitutional chal-
lenge under the foregoing rationale. While the application of section 877(g) might raise pre-
scriptive jurisdiction questions under customary international law in the case of an individ-
ual who spends only thirty-one days in the United States eight or nine years after losing
citizenship, see supra notes 134-141 and accompanying text, such circumstances involve
at least some territorial connection to the United States and would be more difficult to
challenge on constitutional grounds than would the application of section 7701(n). For exam-
ple, the Court found in Brooks that the mere physical location of stock certificates and
bonds in the United States was sufficient to bring those assets within the constitutional taxing
power of the United States. 288 U.S. at 405.
191 See Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
This broad extraterritorial jurisdiction perhaps is most notable in the context of effects-
based jurisdiction as applied to U.S. antitrust laws. See supra note 80 and accompanying
text; see also infra notes 194-199 and accompanying text.
192 See BORN, supra note 104, at 496-98.
193 See id. at 497-500 (citing Cook v. Tait and other early twentieth-century Supreme
Court cases as evidence of the development of "contemporary" limits on legislative juris-
diction).
19' See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. ("Aramco"), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
'95 The Supreme Court recently found that Congress intended to apply Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to foreign-flag cruise ships that dock in United States
ports. See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169, 2178 (2005). For ex-
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cases assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that Congress has the power
to legislate extraterritorially if it chooses to do so. 196
These cases, however, differ from the present circumstances in a signi-
ficant way. The parties in these cases generally have some connection to
the United States sufficient to establish a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction.
For example, in cases regarding the potential extraterritorial application
of labor laws, the cases typically involve a U.S. citizen employee and a
U.S.-incorporated employer.'97 Similarly, in cases involving ships, the
ships typically dock in U.S. ports, carry U.S. passengers, or have some other
connection to the United States.'98 Accordingly, the outer limits of con-
gressional power are not seriously at issue in those cases. Thus, dicta in
those cases stating that Congress has the power to legislate extraterritori-
ally might merely be an acknowledgement that a sufficient jurisdictional
connection exists in those particular cases,'99 rather than a statement that
Congress has unlimited authority in all situations. Accordingly, that dicta
would not be dispositive in the case of an application of section 7701(n)
to tax the worldwide income of a person decades after she notified the De-
partment of State of her citizenship loss, because no recognized prescrip-
tive jurisdictional basis exists.
A complementary line of Supreme Court cases explicitly states that
Congress has the power to enact legislation that contravenes customary in-
ternational law.2 ° These cases can arise either outside U.S. territory or
amples of cases holding that there was not sufficient evidence of congressional intent to
override the presumption against extraterritoriality, see Aramco, 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (then-
existing version of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
cional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (National Labor Relations Act);
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) (Eight Hour Law).
In the present circumstances, sections 877(g) and 7701(n) focus on the worldwide in-
come of former citizens who spend all or a significant portion of their time outside the
United States. Accordingly, by their very nature these provisions evince a congressional intent
to tax persons and income outside the United States, and the presumption against territori-
ality would be overridden.
196 For example, the opinion in Foley Bros. states that "[tihe question before us is not
the power of Congress to extend the Eight Hour Law to work performed in foreign coun-
tries. Petitioner concedes that such power exists." 336 U.S. at 284.
197 See, e.g., Aramco., 499 U.S. at 246; Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 283.
198 See, e.g., Norwegian Cruise Line, 125 S. Ct. at 2175; McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 12;
Benz, 353 U.S. at 139.
199 For example, in support of its brief statement in dicta that Congress has the power
"to extend the Eight Hour Law to work performed in foreign countries," the Foley Bros.
opinion cites Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932), and United States v. Bow-
man, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). Those cases do not purport to grant Congress unlimited prescrip-
tive power worldwide. Rather, both of those cases involved Congress's power to subject
U.S. citizens outside the United States to certain criminal proceedings. Indeed, those cases
referred to the United States's right as a sovereign to assert authority over its citizens.
Thus, the statement in Foley Bros. regarding Congress's extraterritorial powers is best in-
terpreted as referring to Congress's authority over U.S. citizens (the factual situation in
Foley Bros. itself).
200 Cf Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override Customary or Other
International Law in the Course of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 U.S.
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within U.S. territory.20 1 Because of the desire to avoid conflicts with cus-
tomary international law, these cases provide that "[a]n act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other pos-
sible construction remains.'2 °l This presumption against violations of cus-
tomary international law implies that, if it so intends, Congress has the
power to enact legislation violating customary international law. Indeed,
in a dissenting opinion in a non-tax case, Justice Scalia stated "[tihough
it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally pre-
sumed -not to have exceeded those customary international-law limits on
jurisdiction to prescribe.""2 3 Justice Scalia provides no direct citation for
this pronouncement regarding Congress's prescriptive authority, relying
instead on the implication arising from the judicial presumption.2°4
As with the cases addressing the presumption against extraterritori-
ality, these cases involving the presumption against violating customary
international law differ from the section 7701(n) circumstances in a signifi-
cant way. As discussed previously, section 7701(n), at least when applied
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 163, 183 (1989) (arguing that "[t]he President, acting through the
Attorney General, has the inherent constitutional authority to deploy the FBI to investigate
and arrest individuals for violations of United States law, even if those actions contravene
international law").
201 See Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (holding that as a
matter of statutory interpretation, Congress did not intend to violate customary interna-
tional law by applying Jones Act to a foreign-flagged, foreign-owned ship manned by for-
eign seamen, while in U.S. territorial waters); see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571
(1953) (similarly holding that Congress would not intend to violate customary international
law by applying the Jones Act to a foreign-flagged, foreign owned ship in Cuban waters).
Accordingly, this line of cases is separate from the previously discussed line of cases deal-
ing with the presumption against extraterritoriality. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 264 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
202 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall,
C.J.).
203 Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissent
argued that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary Congress should not be considered to have intended an unreasonable application of
the Sherman Act to foreign corporations. Id. at 819.
204 The only relevant citation in the paragraph containing Justice Scalia's statement is
to the Schooner Charming Betsy presumption against interpreting a statute to violate cus-
tomary international law if any other interpretation is possible. Id. at 814-15; see also supra
note 202 and accompanying text (quoting Schooner Charming Betsy presumption). One
D.C. Circuit case, in dicta, makes an assertion similar to that of Justice Scalia, stating that
the "reverse side of this general [Schooner Charming Betsy] canon of statutory construc-
tion, of course, is that courts of the United States are nevertheless obligated to give effect
to an unambiguous exercise by Congress of its jurisdiction to prescribe even if such an exer-
cise would exceed the limitations imposed by international law." FTC v. Compagnie de
Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The D.C. Circuit,
however, made this assertion in a context where the United States clearly had jurisdiction
to prescribe under international law (based on the effects of the foreign company's sales on the
U.S. market). Id. at 1316. Moreover, as the court recognized, the issue in the case involved
jurisdiction to enforce rather than jurisdiction to prescribe. The court applied the Schooner
Charming Betsy presumption to find that Congress had not intended for the statute to per-
mit service of subpoenas abroad in a manner that would violate enforcement jurisdiction
under customary international law. Id. at 1323.
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to a person who many years earlier notified the Department of State of
her loss of citizenship but failed to notify the IRS, lacks any recognized
prescriptive jurisdiction under customary international law. In contrast, the
relevant Supreme Court cases involve situations where the United States
has some valid jurisdictional claim over the matter, but customary interna-
tional law provides that the United States' jurisdiction must yield to that
of another sovereign.
For example, in Lauritzen v. Larsen, °5 the Court observed that cus-
tomary international maritime law provided that Danish law, rather than
the Jones Act, should apply to an injury suffered by a Danish seaman on
a Danish-owned and flagged ship in Cuban waters. The Court, applying
the presumption against violating customary international law, held that,
as a matter of statutory interpretation, Congress did not intend for the
Jones Act to apply and override customary international law. Of particu-
lar relevance to the present inquiry, the Court acknowledged that the United
States had a jurisdictional claim over the case, because the seaman had
been hired in the United States while the ship was in the New York port
and he was later returned to the United States after the voyage.2 °6 Thus,
the Court's implication that Congress had power to override customary in-
ternational law if it so desired might have been based on the inherent un-
derstanding that the United States itself had a valid jurisdictional basis
for prescribing law, even though that basis was inferior to another country's
claim under international law. If so, the case might merely support Con-
gress's ability to override international choice of law principles when multi-
ple countries (including the United States) have jurisdiction, rather than a
broader ability to assert prescriptive jurisdiction even when the United
States has no jurisdictional basis whatsoever under international law.207 Un-
-5 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
2 6 Id. at 582-83.
207 Other cases recognizing Congress's power to override customary international law
also involve facts where the United States has some type of prescriptive jurisdictional basis
but where customary international law would require the United States to defer to a greater
claim of another sovereign. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 145-46 (1812) (holding that although international law provides that ships of
war entering the port of a friendly power are exempt from that host country's jurisdiction,
"[w]ithout doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication"). In
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), the Court implied that Congress, if it had en-
acted a specific statute, could have permitted the seizure of foreign ships that were violat-
ing a U.S. wartime blockade of Cuba. Such a statute would not have fit squarely into the tradi-
tional prescriptive jurisdictional bases, but the wartime situation might have given rise to
protective principles. Moreover, the case does not fit squarely within the current analysis
because any such statute might have been justified by Congress's explicit constitutional au-
thority to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 11.
A legal memorandum prepared by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
relies on the Schooner Exchange and other cases to conclude that "[b]oth Congress and the
President, acting within their respective spheres, retain the authority to override" any cus-
tomary international law limits on U.S. law enforcement in foreign countries. See Author-
ity of the Federal Bureau Of Investigations, supra note 200, at 171. That legal memoran-
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der this interpretation, this line of cases would not necessarily support Con-
gress's power to exercise taxing jurisdiction in circumstances, such as the
potential application of section 7701(n) discussed above, where the United
States has no claim for prescriptive jurisdiction.
At least one federal district court has adopted similar reasoning in a
foreign Commerce Clause setting. In United States v. Yunis, the alien de-
fendant was charged with various federal crimes relating to the hijacking
of a foreign aircraft in a foreign country.2° The court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss with respect to most charges but the court granted the
motion to dismiss with respect to certain charges under a federal statute that
purported to regulate foreign air commerce. The court reasoned:
[T]he government contends that Congress has authority to regu-
late global air commerce under the commerce clause. U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, c.3. The government's arguments based on the com-
merce clause are unpersuasive. Certainly Congress has plenary
power to regulate the flow of commerce within the boundaries of
United States territory. But it is not empowered to regulate for-
eign commerce which has no connection to the United States.
Unlike the states, foreign nations have never submitted to the sov-
ereignty of the United States government nor ceded their regula-
tory powers to the United States.29
A commentator subsequently cited this rationale for the proposition that
Congress does not have the power to make "outrageous assertions" of U.S.
jurisdiction, such as an attempt to "to criminalize a high stakes poker game
between two Australians sailing an Australian sailboat from Australia to
Fiji."210
dum, however, implicitly assumes that the United States has some underlying jurisdictional
connection to the overseas activity. In particular, the memo implicitly invokes "protective
principle" jurisdiction, focusing on the ability of the United States to "protect its own vital
national interests" with respect to terrorist groups and drug traffickers that target the United
States in circumstances where the foreign government fails to take steps to protect the
United States. Id. at 166. Under this interpretation, the memorandum does not necessarily
support an unlimited exercise of congressional power when the United States has no under-
lying jurisdictional connection to the person or activity (as is the case with an extreme applica-
tion of section 7701(n)).
208 681 F. Supp. 896, 898 (1988), conviction aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
2 Id. at 907 n.24 (emphasis added).
210 See Weisburd, supra note 159, at 418-20. Professor Weisburd also relies on the Su-
preme Court decision in United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). In that case,
the Court "addressed in dictum the question whether a statute criminalizing piracies and
felonies at sea should be read as applying to murders committed by aliens against alien
victims upon non-American ships." Weisburd, supra at 419. The Court concluded that
Congress lacked the power to punish murder on the high seas (as opposed to piracy, which is
explicitly covered by Article I, § 8, cl. 9). Furlong, 18 U.S. at 198. Despite Professor Weis-
burd's broad reading of the Furlong decision to support a restricted view of enumerated
Article I powers, such as the commerce clause, when they purport to reach events with no
U.S. connection, the case might instead stand for the narrower proposition that murder,
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In summary, while a constitutional challenge to Congress's power to
enact section 7701(n) may face significant hurdles, such a challenge finds
significant support in the reasoning of those Supreme Court cases that have
addressed the extent of Congress's sovereign powers to tax in an interna-
tional context. The Supreme Court cases applying interpretive presump-
tions against Congress legislating extraterritorially or in violation of cus-
tomary international law do not necessarily imply that Congress has unlim-
ited jurisdiction to tax in situations when there is no valid prescriptive juris-
diction claim under customary international law. Although claims chal-
lenging Congress's power to tax historically have received a chilly response
from the Court and the principal cases discussed above are at least sev-
enty years old, the rationale of those opinions warrants a serious consid-
eration of the outer boundaries of Congress's power to tax in an interna-
tional setting, particularly given the Court's recent willingness to find limita-
tions on Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause of Article I.2I
Despite the potential merits of this argument regarding limitations on
Congress's taxing power, the political question doctrine might preclude
the Supreme Court from addressing it. As the Supreme Court noted in Baker
v. Carr,2"2 the political question doctrine "is primarily a function of the
separation of powers," '213 and the dominant considerations for determining
its applicability turn on "the appropriateness under our system of govern-
ment of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and
also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination. '21 4 While
Baker v. Carr left this determination to case-specific inquiry, it did note sev-
eral relevant factors, including the extent to which the issue touches on
foreign relations. 21 5 To the extent that the Court were to regard the present
issue as a political question, 216 it would decline to rule on the issue and
would not invalidate section 7701(n) as exceeding Congress's powers.
unlike piracy, is not an enumerated power under Article I, section 8, and therefore is be-
yond Congress's legislative authority.
2'1 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked
commerce clause authority to provide a civil remedy for gender-motivated violence); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked commerce clause au-
thority to regulate handguns in school zones). Unlike the international concerns at issue in
the present context, the Morrison and Lopez cases involved federalism concerns.
212 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
213 Id. at 210.
214 Id. (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939)).
215 369 U.S. at 211.
216 See generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Politi-
cal Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002)
(arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions, demonstrate a decreasing reliance on the
political question doctrine and an increasing willingness to decide a broader range of con-
stitutional questions).
2006] 419
Harvard Journal on Legislation
C. Due Process and Equal Protection Limitations
If, notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, Congress is found to
have the power under Article I to enact the AJCA special definitions of tax
citizenship, the statute might still be challenged as violating other consti-
tutional limitations.2 17 This Section considers two potential limitations under
the Fifth Amendment: due process and equal protection. It concludes that
a strong argument exists for invalidating section 7701(n) on due process
grounds for periods after an individual has notified the Department of
State of her citizenship loss but has not yet notified the IRS.
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that an individual sub-
ject to section 7701(n) is an alien for nationality law purposes, and the Su-
preme Court has found that aliens with insufficient connections to the
United States are not entitled to the full protections of the Fifth Amend-
ment.2 8 However, the application of section 7701(n) is itself based on the
fiction that the individual is in some sense a "citizen" who has sufficient
connection to the United States to warrant the imposition of worldwide taxa-
tion. Moreover, any attempt to adjudicate section 7701(n) would occur in
a federal court, where the Supreme Court has shown a stronger willingness
to accord aliens Fifth Amendment protections.2 19
1. Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."220 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as requiring not
only adequate procedures, such as notice and hearing, but also justification
for the government's action.221 The Court has given wide latitude to the
government in applying due process standards, with no economic legisla-
tion having been found to violate the Due Process Clause since 1937.222
217 See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, Es-
TATES AND GIFTS 1.2.1 (3d ed. 1999) ("Like all other federal powers, the right of Con-
gress to levy and collect taxes is subject to a wide range of constitutional limits, including
the due process clause .... ); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 5.2 (3d ed. 1999).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (analogizing
the lack of Fifth Amendment protections for aliens to the refusal to extend Fourth Amendment
protections to the Mexico home of a Mexican citizen).
219 See Weisburd, supra note 159, at 399-403.
22 0 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
221 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 523-
24 (2d ed. 2002).
222 See id. at 601; see also United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 34 (1994) (noting that
these pre-1937 cases were decided during an era characterized by exacting review of eco-
nomic legislation under an approach that 'has long since been discarded.' (quoting Fergu-
son v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963))).
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However, several federal appeals courts2 23 and numerous commentators 24
have observed that in an international setting, an overly broad assertion of
federal prescriptive jurisdiction might violate due process constraints on
federal lawmaking. Section 7701(n), particularly as applied to individuals
after they have notified the Department of State of their citizenship loss
but before they have notified the IRS, appears to present such a situation.
Perhaps the most relevant Supreme Court case is Helvering v. City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 25 which involved a due process challenge in a
domestic setting22 6 to a federal estate tax anti-avoidance provision. In deter-
mining whether the tax statute violated due process, the Court focused on
whether the anti-abuse provision was "unreasonably harsh or oppressive"
or was "arbitrary." 217 While subsequent Supreme Court cases addressing eco-
nomic legislation have formulated the standard somewhat differently, focus-
ing on whether the legislation has a "legitimate legislative purpose fur-
thered by rational means,' '2  a more recent opinion noted that the "harsh
and oppressive" standard "does not differ from the prohibition against arbi-
trary and irrational legislation that applies generally to enactments in the
sphere of economic policy." '229
123 See Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103, 1107 n.l (7th Cir. 1984) ("Were Con-
gress to enact a rule beyond the scope of these [customary international law prescriptive]
principles, the statute could be challenged as violating the due process clause on the
ground that Congress lacked the power to prescribe the rule."); Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
224 See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality
in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 289, 313; Larry
Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SuP. CT.
REV. 179, 206 (1991). But see Weisburd, supra note 159, at 408-17.
225 296 U.S. 85 (1935). Several more recent circuit court cases have relied on City
Bank in analyzing due process challenges to federal tax statutes. See, e.g., Di Portanova v.
United States, 690 F.2d 169, 180 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (upholding constitutionality of earlier ver-
sion of I.R.C. § 877); Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 318 (9th Cir. 1962).
226 Although the decedent was a non-resident citizen, this fact was not relevant to the
decision.
227 City Bank Farmer's Trust, 296 U.S. at 89-90.
228 General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992); see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 221, at 600-01.
229 United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30 (1994) (holding that retroactive estate tax
legislation did not violate due process).
The Supreme Court has established a higher standard for reviewing due process chal-
lenges if a fundamental right is infringed. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 221, at 764. In deter-
mining whether something is a fundamental right, the Supreme Court has included liberties
that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). The Supreme Court has recognized the importance in our
nation's history of the right to renounce citizenship. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967); see also Kirsch, supra note 12. Even if the right to renounce citizenship rises to the
level of a fundamental right, the higher standard of review would not apply. Although sec-
tions 877(g) and 7701(n) apply to individuals who purport to lose citizenship, these tax
provisions do not "infringe" a person's ability to renounce citizenship. In particular, they
do not interfere with a person's ability to commit a potentially expatriating act with the requi-
site intent and have the resulting citizenship loss recognized by the Department of State.
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The Court in City Bank Farmer's Trust concluded that the estate tax
provision at issue did not violate due process because Congress had a le-
gitimate purpose to prevent tax avoidance.230 It was uncontested that trust
property was includible in a decedent's gross estate if the decedent had
previously transferred property to the trust and, at the time of death, had
held a right to revoke the trust.2 31 Congress was concerned that the decedent
might try to plan around this result by conditioning the revocation power
on the consent of a (potentially pliant) trust beneficiary.2 31 Accordingly, the
statute provided that the need for the beneficiary's consent was to be ig-
nored in determining whether the decedent held a revocation power.2 33 The
Court concluded that the statute, by ignoring the beneficiary's consent power
and requiring the property to be included in the decedent's gross estate,
was sufficiently related to Congress's tax avoidance purpose. 31 In effect,
the statute ensured that the underlying estate tax provision (the inclusion
of trust property over which the original donor holds a revocation power)
would be enforceable despite attempts by taxpayers to circumvent it with
potentially meaningless joint consent powers.
As was the estate tax provision in City Bank Farmer's Trust, section
7701(n) was enacted to address tax avoidance concerns. However, section
7701(n) is not rationally related to this purpose when it is used to tax an
individual years after she has notified the Department of State of her ex-
patriating act but before she has complied with the IRS reporting require-
ments.235 For time periods after which the individual has notified the De-
partment of State of her citizenship loss, the only purpose of section 7701(n)
is to ensure that the IRS obtains sufficient information from the individ-
ual to enable enforcement of the alternative tax regime of section 877
(and related estate and gift tax provisions).23 6 Section 877's alternative
tax regime does not impose perpetual worldwide taxation on former citi-
Even though a potential tax taint might remain, for nationality law purposes the loss would
be recognized and other burdens associated with citizenship, such as potential obligations
of military service, would no longer apply.
230 City Bank Fanner's Trust, 296 U.S. at 92. The challenged tax provision was the prede-
cessor to current I.R.C. section 2038 (governing revocable transfers).
231 Id. at 88.
232 Id. at 90.
233 Id. at 88-89.
234 Id. at 91.
235 A stronger relationship exists in the case of an individual who has failed to notify
either the Department of State or the IRS of the expatriation. See supra notes 45-51 and
accompanying text. To the extent an anti-avoidance provision, such as section 7701(n),
imposes the same type of tax (i.e., worldwide taxation) as the underlying provisions that it
is backstopping, there appears to be a rational relationship.
236 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. For periods prior to the notification
of the Department of State, Congress also might have been concerned with an individual's
obtaining the benefits of citizenship while avoiding the burdens of worldwide taxation. See
supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. However, such concerns no longer apply once
the individual has notified the Department of State and thereby had the citizenship loss
documented for nationality law purposes.
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zens; rather, it merely expands the types of U.S. source income upon
which a former citizen will be taxed for a ten-year period. 237 In contrast,
section 7701(n), which purports to backstop the enforcement of section 877,
imposes worldwide taxation on the individual (by treating her as a citizen
for tax purposes), potentially in perpetuity.
The enactment of an anti-abuse provision that imposes taxation much
more broadly than the tax provision it is intended to backstop seems difficult
to justify even under the admittedly lenient rational basis test. The provi-
sion's constitutional infirmity is not based on the mere assertion that Con-
gress could have crafted a better-tailored statute238 (although Congress did,
in fact, create a more narrowly tailored anti-abuse provision in the context of
the 1996 amendments to section 877).239 Rather, it is based on the lack of
any rational connection between the perceived abuse and the legislative re-
sponse. Unlike the anti-abuse estate tax provision in City Bank Farmer's
Trust, which ensured that the underlying estate tax provision would apply
notwithstanding taxpayer's efforts to circumvent it, section 7701(n) bears
no relationship, and is grossly disproportionate to, the U.S. source-focused
alternative tax regime of section 877 that it purports to backstop.
240
If section 7701(n), in this context, were viewed as satisfying the due
process rational basis test, it is difficult to envision any due process limi-
tation on the taxation of individuals in an international context. Taken to
an extreme, a lack of due process violation in the present context might
justify Congress imposing a worldwide taxation regime on almost any non-
resident alien in the guise of an anti-avoidance provision. For example, if
a nonresident alien (who had never been a citizen) failed to report or pay
tax on income connected with a U.S. business or U.S. investment prop-
erty,241 Congress might enact an "anti-abuse" provision that treats the
individual as a citizen for tax purposes, taxable on worldwide income. To
the extent such a response is viewed as having no rational relation to the
prevention of tax avoidance by nonresident aliens, section 7701(n) also
should be viewed as having no rational connection to the prevention of tax
avoidance under section 877. After all, both situations involve an overly
broad application of worldwide taxation to protect the enforceability of a
narrow U.S. source-focused tax regime.
231 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
238 Di Portanova v. United States, 690 F.2d 169, 180 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (upholding a prior
version of I.R.C. § 877 against due process and equal protection challenges, stating that
"the possibility that Congress might draft a better or a more comprehensive statute is not a
reason for invalidating" a statute as long as it meets a minimum rationality test).
239 See 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19.
240 See Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 92 (1935). In this con-
text, the special definition of citizenship provided in section 7701(n) for tax purposes could
be an example of the City Bank Farmer's Trust court's observation that there are due proc-
ess limitations on Congress's ability "to create a fictitious status under the guise of sup-
posed necessity." Id.
241 As discussed supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text, nonresident aliens generally
are taxable on these types of income under the Internal Revenue Code.
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2. Equal Protection
An equal protection claim in the present context would compare the
treatment of expatriates who run afoul of section 877(g) or 7701(n) against
the treatment of expatriates who do not trigger those provisions. 242 In the
most extreme case, involving the application of section 7701(n) to a person
who informed the Department of State of the citizenship loss but failed to
notify the IRS under section 6039G, the relevant inquiry would be whether
the adverse treatment of this person, in contrast to a person who notified
both the Department of State and the IRS, is justified.
Although a "strict scrutiny" standard sometimes applies to classifica-
tions that discriminate against aliens,2 43 it is doubtful that such a standard
would apply in the present circumstance, even though the individual would
be a noncitizen (under nationality laws) at the time the IRS attempts to
assert tax under section 7701(n). First, the Supreme Court has recognized
that Congress has significantly more power than states to establish distinc-
tions based on alienage. 2' That power includes the right to make distinc-
tions not only between aliens and citizens but also among different classes
of citizens.2 45 Moreover, the Court's rationale for providing heightened
scrutiny for state alienage classifications is largely inapplicable in the pre-
sent context. Whereas heightened scrutiny generally is grounded in the
inability of aliens to vote and thereby protect themselves in the political
process, 2 6 former citizens subject to section 7701(n) previously were en-
franchised and voluntarily surrendered that right pursuant to their expa-
triation. The case for strict scrutiny is undercut further by the fact that the
present circumstances involve tax legislation. The Supreme Court has been
particularly reluctant to subject tax statutes to heightened scrutiny, noting
that "legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications
and distinctions in the tax statutes. 247
For the foregoing reasons, it is likely that a court would apply a ra-
tional basis, rather than strict scrutiny, test to sections 877(g) and 7701(n).
Unlike the due process analysis, which focuses on the substantive aspects
242 Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment that applies to the states, the Fifth Amendment
does not explicitly refer to equal protection rights. However, the Supreme Court has held
that equal protection principles apply to the federal government through the Fifth Amend-
ment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
221, at 642-43.
241 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 221, at 739-43.
See id. at 745 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)).
245 Diaz, 426 U.S. at 80.
'4
6 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 221, at 742.
247 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); see also Barclay
& Co. v. Edwards, 267 U.S. 442, 449-50 (1924) (permitting Congress to treat foreign cor-
porations as a separate class for tax purposes); BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 217, 1.2.5
("[T]he tax laws have drawn so many distinctions that even a Supreme Court confident of its
power to distinguish between reasonable and arbitrary behavior in other statutory areas has
hesitated to act as a referee of tax legislation.").
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of the provisions, the equal protection analysis merely focuses on
whether there is a rational basis for creating some kind of distinction be-
tween the classes of persons.248 In this narrow context, it appears that there is
a rationale for distinguishing between former citizens who give up citi-
zenship and run afoul of section 877(g) or 7701(n), and those who give up
citizenship and do not trigger those provisions. In particular, with respect
to section 877(g), the classes spend different amounts of time in the United
States during the ten-year post-expatriation period. With respect to sec-
tion 7701(n), the classes create different levels of enforcement difficulty
for the IRS. Accordingly, a challenge based solely on equal protection con-
cerns would most likely fail.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
As discussed in Part II, certain aspects of the AJCA definitions of tax
citizenship violate the prescriptive jurisdictional bases of customary interna-
tional law. As argued in Part III, certain applications of section 7701(n)
raise significant constitutional concerns, particularly with respect to due
process. Even to the extent the AJCA provisions are consistent with the
Constitution, additional considerations demonstrate the need for Congress to
reconsider its use of special tax-based definitions of citizenship in this
context. This Part briefly summarizes these considerations.
A. Effect on Treaty Network
1. Inapplicability of Treaty Saving Clause
The United States is a party to bilateral income tax treaties with more
than sixty countries.249 While the specific terms of each treaty differ,25 ° tax
treaties generally are structured so that the United States provides certain
relief from U.S. taxation to residents of the treaty partner, while the
248 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 221, at 643.
249 See John Venuti et al., Current Status of U.S. Tax Treaties and International Tax
Agreements, 34 TAX MGM'T. INT'L J. 707, 711 (2005) (listing countries). The United States
also has a network of bilateral estate and/or gift tax treaties with sixteen countries. Id.
250 Discrepancies are due to differences in the tax systems of each treaty partner and
the results of bilateral treaty negotiations. However, the treaties share a common structure
and common provisions and are based on similar model treaties. See ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL
TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL (2000), reprinted in MODEL TAX CONVEN-
TION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Devel-
opment, 2000) [hereinafter OECD Model Treaty]; Dep't of Treasury, United States Model
Income Tax Convention of Sept. 20, 1996, http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/
model996.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model Treaty] (based largely on the OECD Model Treaty);
Dep't of Treasury, Technical Explanation of the United States Model Income Tax Conven-
tion of Sept. 20, 1996, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/usmtech.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model
Technical Explanation].
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treaty partner reciprocally provides relief from its tax to residents of the
United States.25 ' For example, the Internal Revenue Code generally imposes
a thirty percent tax on certain U.S. source investment income earned by a
nonresident alien and imposes a graduated tax on income connected to a
nonresident alien's conduct of a U.S. trade or business. However, if the tax-
payer is a resident of a country with which the United States has an income
tax treaty, the treaty either eliminates or reduces the U.S. tax on the indi-
vidual's U.S. investment income252 and prevents the United States from tax-
ing the individual's U.S. business income unless the individual conducts
the business through a "permanent establishment" in the United States.21 3
Under a treaty's definition of "resident," it is possible that a U.S. citizen
living abroad could be treated as a resident of the other country for treaty
purposes.25 4 Nonetheless, U.S. tax treaties contain a "saving clause" that
prevents such a U.S. citizen from invoking the treaty against the United
States to reduce her U.S. tax liability.255 For example, a U.S. citizen who
resides in the United Kingdom might be treated as a resident of the United
Kingdom under the U.S.-U.K. treaty's tie-breaker rule. Nevertheless, the
United States, pursuant to the treaty's saving clause, reserves the right to
exercise its full taxing jurisdiction over the U.S. citizen.
The U.S. Model Treaty contains a special definition of "citizen" for
purposes of applying the saving clause:
[flor this purpose [i.e., the saving clause], the term "citizen" shall
include a former citizen ... whose loss of such status had as one
of its principal purposes the avoidance of tax (as defined under the
laws of the Contracting State of which the person was a citizen
or long-term resident), but only for a period of 10 years following
such loss.
2 5 6
This aspect of the saving clause is intended to ensure that the United States
can impose tax under Internal Revenue Code section 877 on a person
who has surrendered U.S. citizenship, even if the individual subsequently
251 In addition to providing benefits to certain taxpayers, income tax treaties often con-
tain provisions that benefit the respective governments' abilities to enforce their tax laws.
For example, income tax treaties generally provide for information exchange and limited
collection assistance between the respective tax administrators. See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty,
supra note 250, art. 26; 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 98-99 n.377 (citing five in-
come tax treaties that contain broad collection assistance provisions).
252 See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 250, arts. 10 (dividends), 11 (interest), and 12
(royalties).
253 See, e.g., id. art. 7.
2 See id. art. 4. If the individual meets the general definition of "resident" with respect to
both countries, the definition's tie-breaker rules might treat her as a resident of the other
country. See id.
2'5 See id. art. 1, para. 4. The treaty contains limited exceptions to the saving clause,
which allow a U.S. citizen who is resident in the other treaty country to claim certain benefits
of the treaty. See id. art. 1, para. 5(a).
256 See U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 250, art. 1, para. 4.
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acquires residence in a country with which the United States has a tax
treaty.257 The treaty provision's focus on former citizens "whose loss of such
status had as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of tax" tracks
the threshold requirement of section 877 in effect prior to the enactment
of the AJCA. Following the enactment of the AJCA, tax liability under
section 877 no longer depends on whether the former citizen had a prin-
cipal purpose of tax avoidance. 25 8
The enactment of the AJCA raises significant issues regarding the ap-
plicability of the treaty saving clause to individuals who lose citizenship
under the nationality laws. 2 9 Of particular relevance, it raises the ques-
tion of whether the saving clause applies to an individual who has lost
citizenship under the nationality laws but who continues to be treated as
a citizen for tax purposes under section 877(g) or 7701(n).26°
The general language of the saving clause provides that the United
States "by reason of citizenship may tax its citizens, as if the Convention
had not come into effect."26' The principal issue, then, is whether the treaty's
reference to a "citizen" encompasses only those individuals who are citi-
zens in a nationality law sense or whether it is broad enough to cover an
211 See U.S. Model Technical Explanation, supra note 250, at 6.
258 See supra note 18.
259 As a practical matter, a former citizen who is subject to the ACJA provisions might
be unlikely to move to a country with which the United States has a tax treaty. See supra note
64.
260 The AJCA modifications to section 877 also raise the question of whether the sav-
ing clause applies to a person whose nationality loss is respected for tax purposes and who
is subject to the alternative tax regime of section 877. Although this Article focuses on expatri-
ates whose expatriation is not respected for tax purposes, this question is worth brief con-
sideration. The principal issue is whether the model treaty's special saving clause definition
regarding former citizens, which tracks the tax-motivation language of pre-AJCA sec-
tion 877, continues to apply now that section 877 no longer depends on a principal purpose
of tax avoidance. See supra note 18. A strong argument can be made that the saving clause
does not apply, and the United States therefore cannot apply the section 877 alternative tax
regime to a former citizen who is a resident of a treaty country. Although the treaty saving
clause states that the existence of tax avoidance motive is determined "under the laws of
the Contracting State of which the person was a citizen," that language has no direct rele-
vance under the post-AJCA version of section 877, because the new statute does not pur-
port to look at tax motivation. See 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 206 (observing that
"no subsequent inquiry into the taxpayer's intent would be required or permitted"); IRS,
Notice 2005-36, supra note 39, at 1007 (observing that new section 877 applies "without
regard to tax motivation"). But see 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 206 (noting that
the objective monetary thresholds of new section 877 are intended to "serve as a proxy for
tax motivation"). To the extent the other treaty country may have been willing to accept the
saving clause's applicability to pre-AJCA section 877 because that statute looked to actual
tax motivation, the treaty country might view the new section 877, with its purely objective
inquiry and lack of any reference to tax motivation, as beyond the scope of the saving clause.
The IRS might be able to address this problem by making a factual determination of tax
avoidance purpose with respect to a former citizen who establishes residence in a treaty part-
ner and is otherwise subject to new section 877, although such a factual inquiry would
raise the many administrative difficulties that led Congress to discard motivation in the statute.
See also infra note 286 (noting that the legislation probably will not be treated as overrid-
ing the treaty in this context).
261 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 250, art. 1, para. 4.
2006]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
individual who, despite having lost citizenship under the nationality laws,
is labeled as a "citizen" for tax purposes under the Internal Revenue Code.
Both the language of the treaty and the general circumstances surround-
ing treaty negotiations suggest that the treaty reflects the former interpre-
tation and that the general saving clause therefore cannot be invoked to tax
the worldwide income of the individual. The U.S. Model Treaty does not
provide a specific definition of the term "citizen. '262 However, it does re-
fer to citizenship in the context of defining the term "national. 263 The term
"national" of a Contracting State is defined, with respect to an individual,
as "any individual possessing the nationality or citizenship of that State."2 64
This "possessing" citizenship language, as commonly used, refers to a per-
son who holds citizenship in the nationality law sense and is thereby enti-
tled to the benefits of citizenship. 265 Moreover, the official commentary to
the OECD Model Treaty, upon which this provision of the U.S. Model is
based,2" makes clear that the definition of the term "national" is governed
by the nationality laws of each state.2 67
This connection between the treaty's use of the term citizenship and
a country's nationality laws is furthered by the special reference to former
citizens in the saving clause. The saving clause specifies that "citizens"
shall include those who relinquished their citizenship within the prior ten
years with "one of [their] principle purposes the avoidance of tax. ' 26s The
inclusion of this special definition strongly implies that, in its absence, the
saving clause's general preservation of taxing jurisdiction over "citizens"
applies only to individuals who currently are citizens in the nationality law
sense. Moreover, the special definition's use of the term "former citizen"
262 See U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 250, art. 3 (no definition of citizenship in the "Gen-
eral Definitions" article).
263 See id. art. 3, para. 1(h). The definition of "national" is relevant for purposes of the
residence tie-breaker provision, the taxation of income from government services, and the
application of non-discrimination provisions. See id. art. 4, para. 2; art. 19; art. 24, para. 1.264 Id. art. 3, para. 1 (h).
265 See also U.S. Model Technical Explanation, supra note 250, at 82 (using the terms
"citizenship" and "nationality" interchangeably in explaining that, in the event of certain
disputes arising under a tax treaty, taxpayers can present their case "only to the competent
authority of their country of residence, or citizenship/nationality").
26 See id. at 11 ("This definition [of national] is closely analogous to that found in the
OECD Model.").
267 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMMITTEE ON
FISCAL AFFAIRS, COMMENTARY ON MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL art. 3,
8 (2000), reprinted in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2000) [hereinafter OECD Model Com-
mentary] ("Obviously, in determining what is meant by 'the nationals of a Contracting State'
in relation to individuals, reference must be made to the sense in which the term is usually
employed and each State's particular rules on the acquiring or loss of nationality." (em-
phasis added)). Indeed, the drafters of the commentary apparently viewed this relationship
between the term "national" and the countries' nationality laws as self-evident, stating that
"[iut was not judged necessary to include in the text of the Convention any more precise
definition of nationality, nor did it seem indispensable to make any special comment on the
meaning and application of the word." Id.
268 See supra text accompanying note 256.
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and reference to the ten-year period following the loss of citizenship makes
clear that the term "citizen" is used in its nationality law sense.
269
One definitional provision of the U.S. Model Treaty potentially sup-
ports an interpretation of the term "citizen" in the saving clause to include a
person who has lost citizenship under the nationality law but is treated as
a tax citizen under the AJCA provisions. The catch-all provision of the
general definitions article provides that "unless the context otherwise re-
quires," a term not otherwise defined in the treaty should "have the mean-
ing which it has at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of
the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under the applicable
tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under
other laws of that State. 2
0
This provision implies that the term "citizen" in the saving clause,
because it is not otherwise explicitly defined in the treaty, should have the
same meaning it has under the laws of the United States, with the U.S.
tax law's definition taking precedence. Under such a reading, an individ-
ual who is treated as a citizen for tax purposes under the new AJCA provi-
sion would be a citizen within the meaning of the saving clause, and the
United States would retain unlimited taxing jurisdiction over the individ-
ual.
The principal shortcoming of this argument is that the treaty looks to
the domestic law definition only if the context does not otherwise require.27" '
In the case of the citizenship definition, the context does otherwise require.
As discussed above, both the treaty and the technical explanation repeat-
edly use the terms "citizen" and "citizenship" by reference to the nationality
law. Moreover, the special "former citizen" definition in the saving clause
is understandable only if citizenship is understood in the nationality law
sense.
In addition, the Treasury Department's technical explanation to this
catch-all provision states that the domestic law's definition of an otherwise
undefined term is not applicable if it "lead[s] to results that are at vari-
ance with the intentions of the negotiators and of the Contracting States
when the treaty was negotiated and ratified. '272 Given the reluctance of most
countries to recognize United States taxing jurisdiction over actual citi-
zens residing outside the United States, it is extremely unlikely that a treaty
partner's negotiators would have intended that the U.S. could stretch its
taxing jurisdiction under the treaty to cover the worldwide income of indi-
viduals who are no longer U.S. citizens under the nationality law. Indeed,
269 Indeed, at the time the U.S. Model Treaty was developed and the actual treaties based
on it were negotiated, there was no special tax definition of citizenship under the Internal
Revenue Code. The treaty negotiators most likely did not contemplate the possibility that
"citizen" could refer to anything other than its commonly understood nationality law status.
270 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 250, art. 3, para. 2.
271 See id.
272 U.S. Model Technical Explanation, supra note 250, at 12.
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by including a narrow expansion of the saving clause to permit taxation of
tax-motivated "former citizens" for ten years under the pre-AJCA version
of section 877,273 negotiators implicitly agreed that the United States could
not unilaterally effect a significant jurisdictional expansion over the world-
wide income of a broader class of former citizens in perpetuity.
A final consideration involves the potential use of the special "for-
mer citizen" language of the saving clause as a basis itself for taxing a for-
mer citizen (in the nationality law sense) who is a resident of the other coun-
try. The AJCA provisions, by treating the person as a citizen, cause the
individual to be taxable on worldwide income. This goes far beyond the lim-
ited jurisdiction contemplated by the special "former citizen" treaty lan-
guage. That special provision, drafted in the context of pre-AJCA section
877, was intended merely to allow the United States to impose a slightly
expanded version of source taxation to the tax-motivated former citizen
than would otherwise apply to a nonresident alien.274 This narrow purpose
of section 877 is made clear in the Treasury Department's Technical Ex-
planation to the U.S. Model Treaty,275 as well as the technical explanations
to actual tax treaties that contain the provision.2 76 Accordingly, if the United
States were to attempt to bootstrap worldwide taxation using this narrow
"former citizen" provision of the saving clause, the other treaty country
could be expected to object.
2. Potential Treaty Override
Before concluding that this analysis would permit a former citizen
(in a nationality law sense) who resides in a treaty country to invoke the
benefits of the treaty to prevent the United States from applying the new
AJCA provisions, it is important to consider the relationship between tax
treaties and statutes. Once a tax treaty enters into force, it constitutes the
"supreme Law of the Land"2 77 under the Constitution, along with the In-
ternal Revenue Code and other federal statutes.278
Given the equal constitutional weight of treaties and statutes, 279 courts
have adopted several principles to determine whether a taxpayer is sub-
ject to tax when a tax code provision imposes tax but a treaty purports to call
273 See supra notes 256-258 and accompanying text.
274 Most notably, under the alternative regime of section 877, the former citizen is tax-
able on gain from the sale of stock in a U.S. domestic corporation, which ordinarily is not
taxable when derived from a nonresident alien. See I.R.C. § 877(b). See generally supra
notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
275 See U.S. Model Technical Explanation, supra note 250, at 6.
276 See, e.g., Dep't of Treasury, Technical Explanation to the U.S.-U.K. Income Tax
Treaty 6 (Mar. 5, 2003), http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policyllibrary/teus-uk.pdf.
277 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
278 Id.
279 See I.R.C. §§ 894(a), 7852(d)(1) (2005).
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off taxation.280 As a threshold matter, courts will attempt to interpret the
treaty and the statute in a way that avoids a conflict between the two. 28' If
a nonconflicting interpretation is not possible, courts generally give prece-
dence to the provision that was adopted later in time.28 2 Thus, it is possi-
ble that Congress can enact a statutory provision that overrides a provision
of a preexisting bilateral tax treaty. However, given the significance of the
United States unilaterally overriding its international treaty obligations,
283
courts adopt such an interpretation only if Congress expresses a clear intent
that the statute override a preexisting treaty provision.2 4
In the present context, if the treaty saving clause does not apply, then
the statute cannot be read consistently with the treaty-the treaty would pre-
vent the United States from taxing the individual, whereas the ACJA pro-
visions would purport to impose tax. Accordingly, the relevant question is
whether Congress, in enacting AJCA, expressed a clear intention that the
statute override preexisting treaties, such as those based on the U.S. Model
Treaty. In contrast to the 1996 amendments to section 877, wherein the
committee reports explicitly discussed the extent to which a treaty override
was intended,285 neither the statutory language of section 877 nor the rele-
vant committee reports discuss this issue. Indeed, there is no indication that
Congress considered whether the new statutory provisions might lead to
a treaty conflict. Moreover, the JCT Report, upon which the legislation was
based, did not address the potential treaty conflict that could result, nor
did it indicate that the JCT recommendation was intended to override any
treaty obligations. Given this lack of congressional intent to override a
treaty, it is likely that a court would follow the jurisdictional limitations
280See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME
TAX TREATIES 64 (1992). For a more detailed explanation of these principles, including
illustrations of their application to specific treaty provisions, see JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J.
PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 4.03 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1992).
211 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 280, at 64.
282 Id.
283 Because a treaty override may be considered a breach of the tax treaty, the treaty part-
ner may have remedies available to it under international law, including the possibility of
terminating or suspending the treaty in the case of a material breach. See generally ORGANISA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS,
TAX TREATY OVERRIDE, R(8)-10 (2000), reprinted in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2000); see
also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 280, at 73-77 (recommending that "the United
States should not adopt a policy of implementing legislation in a manner that would consti-
tute a breach of its obligations under income tax treaties").
284 See KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 280, 4.03. For a list of several occasions in the
past thirty years in which Congress has overridden tax treaty provisions, see Infanti, supra
note 279, at 682-83; cf Avi-Yonah, supra note 73, at 493-96 (arguing that several recent
congressional treaty overrides were justified due to the excessively slow pace of treaty negotia-
tions).
285 The 1996 conference report contained an unusual directive that 1996 legislative
changes would override then-existing treaties for only ten years, at which time any then-
existing treaties that had not yet been renegotiated would no longer be overridden. See
H.R. REP. No. 104-738, at 329 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
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imposed by the treaty, thereby precluding the application of the AJCA spe-
cial tax citizenship definitions in the context discussed above.
8 6
B. Undermining Respect for International Law
By violating customary international law jurisdictional principles,
the AJCA tax citizenship definitions might undermine respect among other
countries for international law, particularly in the tax context. The United
States depends on other countries' general adherence to the principles of
international law. To the extent that other countries no longer feel com-
pelled to comply with these standards, or seek to retaliate against United
States companies or individuals in response to the United States' perceived
overreaching,287 U.S. interests might suffer.
Justice Scalia has noted the importance of prescriptive comity, whereby
sovereign nations afford each other respect by limiting the reach of their
laws.288 Under this principle, U.S. interests might be better served if Con-
gress refrained from prescribing laws that could be perceived as unrea-
sonable, even if jurisdiction technically exists under customary interna-
tional law.289 Obviously, this argument regarding the potential adverse im-
pact of overbroad legislation is even stronger when international law ju-
risdiction is lacking, as in the present case.
C. Enforcement Difficulties
A final concern is extremely important from a practical perspective.
Even if the AJCA provisions are upheld as constitutional, they will probably
yield little revenue and be extremely difficult to enforce. Congress has
imposed various versions of section 877 (and the related estate and gift
tax provisions) for almost forty years, and the IRS has had significant en-
forcement problems since the outset." ° Although the issue occupied signifi-
cant congressional time in the mid-1990s, the resulting modifications in
286 A similar rationale would-preclude the IRS from applying post-AJCA section 877
to a person whose loss of citizenship is respected for tax purposes. See supra note 260.
281 Cf Christopher J. Lord, Note, Stapled Stock and I.R.S. Sec. 269B: Ill-Conceived
Change in the Rules of International Tax Jurisdiction, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1066, 1089-90
(1986) (observing that other countries might perceive the U.S. staple stock regime to be an
overbroad taxation of foreign corporations and might therefore retaliate against U.S. cor-
porations). It is possible that such retaliation might itself violate customary international
law. See supra note 155.
288See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
289 See id. at 818 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403(1) (1987)).
290 See 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 83-102 (summarizing enforcement prob-
lems with 1996 legislation); Kirsch, supra note 12, at 881-83 (summarizing enforcement
problems with original 1966 legislation).
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1996 had only limited effect and created additional administrative, prob-
lems of their own.291
While some aspects of the AJCA-particularly the elimination of the
previously existing ruling process and its subjective inquiry into motiva-
tion-may alleviate administrative difficulties, the AJCA provisions cre-
ating special definitions of citizenship for tax purposes will create additional
enforcement difficulties. Prior to the enactment of the AJCA, section 877
focused on expanding the definition of U.S. source income-in particular,
focusing on gains from the sale of domestic U.S. corporations. While that
expansion of the tax base might have created some enforcement problems,
at least it focused on property with a U.S. connection, thereby creating a
possibility that the IRS could enforce the provision. In contrast, the new
provisions, by treating the individual as a citizen taxable on her worldwide
income, put the IRS in an almost impossible enforcement position.292 Prob-
lems could arise both with respect to the IRS receiving information re-
garding the individual and her potential tax liability, and with respect to
enforcing the law if the individual is determined to have tax liability.
293
Regarding the information collection problem, the individuals to
whom the AJCA tax citizenship definitions apply might have little future
contact with the United States. Whereas a person subject to section 877(g)
will at least have thirty-one days of contact, a person subject to section
7701(n) might have none, particularly if that person has already notified
the Department of State of her citizenship loss but has failed to notify the
IRS. Given the admitted difficulties the IRS has had in enforcing world-
wide taxation against continuing U.S. citizens who happened to live
abroad,294 the chance of collecting useful information with respect to the
new class of tax citizens is slim. The United States does not have unilat-
eral authority to conduct tax investigations overseas.2 95 Even if the individual
resides in a country with which the United States has a tax treaty that gener-
291 See 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 83-137 (discussing administrative and en-
forcement problems of 1996 legislation).
292 Even the 2003 JCT Report, upon which the AJCA provisions were based, acknowl-
edged that "with the person, property, and income outside of the United States, effective
administration of' a rule that indefinitely taxes a nonresident noncitizen on worldwide income
"may be impossible." 2003 JCT REPORT, supra note 19, at 109.
293 As prominent commentators have noted, an analysis of jurisdiction to prescribe "is
incomplete without also taking into account the limits on jurisdiction to adjudicate and en-
force. A country cannot enforce an income tax in the absence of information and the ability
to compel compliance." Shay et al., supra note 87, at 116; see also ISENBERGH, supra note
160, 1.5.2; Hellerstein, supra note 73, at 13 (discussing theoretical and practical limita-
tions on jurisdiction to enforce tax collection); Martin Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and Inter-
national Income, 17 TAX L. REV. 431, 432 (1962) ("Tax jurisdiction in practice is a differ-
ent matter from tax jurisdiction in theory. However lawful an assertion of tax jurisdiction
may be, power to make the assertion effective is nevertheless required.").294 See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 46, para. 27.
295 See Authority of the Federal Bureau Of Investigations, supra note 200, at 165 (ob-
serving that the United States cannot mount tax investigations in another state's territory
except under the terms of a treaty or with the consent of the other country).
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ally provides for information sharing, the other country is unlikely to
provide the IRS with information under the treaty regarding the individual.2 96
Even if the IRS becomes aware of a taxable event regarding a tax
citizen-for example, if a well-known person who has surrendered citizen-
ship (in the nationality law sense) subsequently dies, the death might be
reported in the press-the IRS will have little ability to collect any taxes.
In particular, if the individual has no ongoing connection to the United
States, the United States might have neither in personam nor in rem ju-
risdiction with respect to collection attempts.2 97 Moreover, under longstand-
ing principles of international law, the country in which the individual
resides generally is not required to recognize or enforce judgments for the
collection of taxes rendered by a U.S. court.2 9s
Thus, to the extent that Congress was attempting to improve compli-
ance with respect to citizens and long-term residents who lose their status,
these AJCA provisions will prove disappointing. Of course, it is possible
that revenue collection was not Congress's only concern. After all, relatively
few individuals expatriate each year, and Congress's prior sojourns in this
area have been fraught with symbolic political concerns.299 However, to
the extent that Congress sought to make a symbolic statement in the AJCA
by purporting to heighten the tax consequences of renouncing citizen-
ship, its approach might have backfired. In particular, to the extent poten-
tial expatriates perceive that the new provisions are unenforceable, they
might be encouraged to expatriate. Moreover, to the extent the general pub-
lic perceives that Congress has enacted unenforceable legislation, the
public's respect for the tax system, and desire to comply, might be under-
mined.3°°
V. CONCLUSION
Under U.S. tax law, significant tax burdens are imposed on U.S. citi-
zens. The worldwide taxation of U.S. citizens traditionally has been justified
296 See supra notes 249-276 and accompanying text.
297 This potential lack of court jurisdiction to adjudicate should be distinguished from
the lack of legislative jurisdiction to prescribe, which is the focus of this Article. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. IV, intro.
note; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).29 8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 483 (1987). Although the foreign country might have discretion to enforce a U.S. court
judgment regarding collection, see id. cmt. a, given the AJCA provisions' jurisdictional over-
reach, it is highly doubtful that a foreign country would exercise such discretion.
299 See generally Kirsch, supra note 12 (discussing symbolic aspects of 1996 legisla-
tion).
100 Id. at 917 (citing studies regarding social norms and tax compliance). These poten-
tial problems illustrate the observation by a commentator in another context that a "nation
has little to gain from attempting to levy on property, taxpayers, or activities that are beyond
the limits of the nation's enforcement power." Robert L. Palmer, Toward Unilateral Coher-
ence in Determining Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (1989).
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based on the important link between the rights and obligations of citizen-
ship. Merely calling a person a citizen for tax purposes does not neces-
sarily justify imposing the same significant tax consequences that attach
to "real" citizens.
This Article demonstrates the significant problems that arise under
customary international law and the U.S. Constitution when the term "citi-
zen" is separated from its conceptual underpinnings. In particular, in cer-
tain situations the treatment of an individual as a citizen for tax purposes
after she has lost citizenship for nationality law purposes violates the
prescriptive jurisdictional limitations of customary international law and
raises significant questions regarding the statute's constitutionality, both
with respect to Congress's Article I power to enact the tax and with respect
to Fifth Amendment due process. Even to the extent the provisions are con-
stitutional, they might create conflicts with U.S. tax treaty partners and
undermine respect for international law in the tax field. Moreover, they ulti-
mately may be of little practical benefit to the United States, given the signi-
ficant enforcement difficulties they create.
Assuming that Congress continues to believe that renunciation of citi-
zenship necessitates a targeted response,30' Congress should reconsider
the special tax definitions of citizenship enacted by AJCA. To the extent
Congress is concerned with the Department of State's administrative pro-
cedures and evidentiary standards for determining when citizenship is
lost, it should consider the possibility of revising relevant aspects of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.30 2 To the extent it is concerned with tax-
motivated former citizens re-entering the United States for significant peri-
ods, it should consider amending relevant 1996 immigration law provisions
to make them properly targeted and enforceable.3 3 Regardless of which,
if any, alternative approaches are enacted to address tax-motivated expa-
triation, 3 the definition of citizenship in regards to tax should be returned to
its historic roots in the nationality law.
301 While it is unlikely that any significant number of elected officials would take the
position that the tax code should not contain special rules targeting tax-motivated expatri-
ates, well-reasoned arguments for that position have been advocated by Professor Alice
Abreu. See Alice G. Abreu, Taxing Exits, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1158 (1996) (argu-
ing that individuals should be able to weigh the value of U.S. citizenship against the tax
benefits of expatriation and act accordingly).
302 For example, in 1995 the Clinton administration proposed a Department of State-
initiated Consular Efficiency Act, which would have provided that an individual could lose
citizenship under the nationality laws only by taking an oath of renunciation before a U.S.
consular official, with loss of citizenship effective as of the date of the oath. See TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 46, at 35.
303 The 1996 immigration provisions (the Reed Amendment) are summarized supra
note 62; see also Kirsch, supra note 12, at 935-36 (outlining a proposal for narrowly tar-
geting the Reed Amendment in an enforceable way).
304 The other significant proposal frequently considered in this area involves a mark-to-
market approach, where an expatriate is treated for tax purposes as having sold all her assets
on the date of her citizenship loss and, thereafter, she is treated as any other nonresident
alien. See also Andrew Walker, The Tax Regime for Individual Expatriates: Whom to Im-
2006]
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The analysis set forth in this Article also has broader implication be-
yond its application to the new AJCA provisions. In a world of increased
individual mobility, Congress may have future occasion to consider the
extent to which it will assert taxing jurisdiction over individuals with only
limited connections to the United States. The constitutional and intema-
tional law limitations addressed herein deserve attention in any such leg-
islative action.
press?, 58 TAX LAW. 555, 562 (2005) (proposing a departure wealth tax based on the estate
tax). See generally Kirsch, supra note 12, at 883-86 (describing mark-to-market propos-
als).
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